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Editorial Note
Welcome to our 3rd volume!
As chief editor, I am pleased to introduce the first issue of our 3rd volume of IJAD for Fall
2015. From the over 7800 downloads so far, with our authors and audience coming from all over
the world, our goal of being international is being met.
This volume constitutes the 5th issue of IJAD that began in Fall 2013 and presents four
papers on challenges and opportunities for sustainable agriculture, human capital and technology.
The first paper analyzes the role of inflation, external market performance and government policy,
the tradeoff between inflation and balance of payment and the risks of inflationary pressures of
foreign exchange reserves that African states have to contend with for effective governance. The
second paper evaluates and analysis farmer training programs based on evidence from small
farmers in Western Ethiopia and makes recommendations for improved autonomy and freedom
for farmers for positive outcomes in future training programs. The third paper focuses on human
capital capacity building to reduce poverty, that includes investment on education and health and
reducing gender gap and inequality. The last paper deals with deindustrialization of African
economies due to lack of good governance and leadership that drives misguided economics and
business policy decisions.
Effective structural positive change is blocked due to problems of corruption, lack of
transparency, ineffective public service at all levels of governance. For Africa, effective
transformation from agrarian economies to manufacturing, requires good governance and
leadership that promotes enabling business environments including investing in science and
technology and moving toward freedom of private sector and citizens to form associations and
build effective government and private partnerships that provides bottom up instead of top down
approach including closing the gender gap in education, health and increasing employment
opportunities.
Sisay Asefa, Chief Editor
International Journal of African Development
http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/
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Inflation, External Market Performance and Government Policy: An Empirical
Investigation Using VAR-VECM Approach in the Context of Ethiopia
Nardos M Beyene, Western Michigan University,
Abstract
This study aims at determining the effectiveness of demand management policies in
stabilizing the macroeconomic environment of Ethiopian economy. Inflation and Balance
of Payments are used as the two indicators of stability. The researcher made use of Cointegrated VAR approach and estimates inflation and balance of payments equations. All
together the researcher used data for the period 1976-2011. The findings of the study imply
the existence of two-way relationship between inflation and balance of payments. Excess
balance of payment surplus leads to inflationary pressures in the economy while inflation
booming deteriorates the country’s external balance.

Ethiopia is pursuing a public sector led development strategy that focuses on promoting
growth through high public investment facilitated partly by low nominal interest rates. The strategy
calls for government directed economic policy, with a dominant role for public enterprises in
infrastructure development. Within this development strategy, the authorities adopted both
medium and long-term visions. Its medium term vision is to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). This should be achieved at the end of the implementation of the five-year plan,
named as the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) (IMF, 2012). The planning period for the
GTP spans the period 2010/11-2014/15. Its long-term vision, on the other hand, is to build on the
achievements of the GTP and become a middle-income country in the coming ten years. Among
its strategic pillars is an emphasis on agriculture, promotion of industrialization, and investment in
infrastructure (MOFED, 2010/11). The strategy has contributed to lifting economic growth; In
2010/11 real GDP growth was 11.4 percent moderately higher than the 10 percent growth a year
earlier. The overall economic performance, measured by growth in real GDP, between 2003/042010/11, registered an average annual growth rate of 11.4% (NBE, 2010/11). This robust and
broad based economic growth places Ethiopia among the top performing African and other
developing Asian countries. In the fiscal year 2010/11, agriculture grew by 9.0 percent due to
improved productivity, good weather conditions, and conducive policy environment. The industry
sector has also expanded by 15.0 percent, owing to investment in electricity & water as well as
construction sector. Service sector growth, however, slightly declined to 12.5 percent from 13.0
percent a year ago (NBE, 2010/11).
The main development objective of Ethiopia is to eradicate poverty in a relatively short
period of time. This would be achieved by implementing broad based development policies that
would not only enhance economic growth but would also adhere to the principles of an equitable
distribution of the benefits from such growth. Robust growth in the recent past and pro-poor focus
of the government budget has resulted in significant poverty reduction: estimates indicate that the
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poverty head count declined from 38.7 percent in 2004/05 to 29.6 percent in 2010/11 (IMF, 2012).
Despite these achievements, the Ethiopian economy has been facing serious macroeconomic
imbalances. Inflation rose above 40 percent in August 2011 from 10 percent in November 2010
and resulted in highly negative real interest rate and an overvalued real exchange rate (IMF, 2012).
Moreover, according to annual report of MOFED (2010/11) during the years spanning between
2003/04 and 2008/09 the rate of inflation recorded an average annual rate of 15%; reaching its
highest of 36.4% for 2008/09. The inflation experienced in the country was largely driven by food
inflation. Federal government budget execution and monetary policy were tightened later in 2011
and this resulted in declining inflation, though still elevated. However, other risks and
vulnerabilities related to the financing model of the large public investment projects are now
emerging (IMF, 2012).
The Recent Macroeconomic Environment
According to reports by different institutions, the Ethiopian economy registers remarkable
double-digit growth for the last eight years. The real GDP growth has remained above 10 percent
since 2003/04 when the Ethiopian economy recovered from a severe drought in 2002/03 (IMF,
2012). In 2010/11 the growth rate reached 11.4% according to reports by the government and IMF
(2012) lowers the rate to 7.5%. This was one of the highest growth rates registered by Sub-Saharan
countries. The average growth rate for these economies was only 5.2%.
GDP growth (annual %)
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Figure1. Annual Ethiopian GDP growth. Constructed based on data obtained from World Bank
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In terms of the structure of the economy, the contribution of agriculture to overall GDP
was 47% in 2003/04. The share declined gradually and reached 41.1% in 2010/11. The share of
industry showed no significant change, accounting on average for 13.3% of the total value added
over the last eight years. On the other hand, during this period, the service sector became the
dominant in the economy with its share increasing from 39.7% in 2003/04 to 46.6% in 2010/11
(MOFED, 2010/11).
Despite this reported significant increase in output, the country experienced general
inflationary pressures. Annual average general inflation at the close of the fiscal year 2010/11 was
18.1%, measured by a 12-month moving average, about 15.3% higher than the preceding year.
During the years 2003/04 and 2004/05, the general rates of inflation were 7.3% and 6.1%,
respectively, and rose to 10.6% in 2005/06 (MOFED, 2009/10). For the years 2006/07, 2007/08
and 2008/09, the general annual inflation rates were 15.8%, 25.3% and 36.4%, respectively. These
were largely driven by the trend of the food price component, which showed 21% annual average
growth during 2003/04–2008/09 (MOFED, 2009/10).
Another important dimension of macroeconomic environment is Balance of Payment
condition. According to a report by IMF (2012), Ethiopia had been accumulating foreign exchange
reserves since 2008 when the country faced world commodity price surge and ever flowing fund
support. But the trend reversed in 2011 as a result of foreign exchange reserve sales to control
domestic liquidity. Reports suggest due attention to be given to the sustainability of the foreign
exchange reserve sales as a key monetary policy instrument as foreign exchange reserves (FX) in
months of imports have declined. These reports advise the authorities to begin gradually building
FX coverage to about 3 months of imports mainly through some flexibility in the exchange rate,
which will improve the current account balance. Foreign exchange reserves decreased from a peak
at about US$3.5 billion in September 2011 to about US$2.3 billion (1.8 months of prospective
imports) in April 2012. The current level is well below the commonly used rule of thumb of 3
months of import cover, potentially putting external stability at risk (IMF, 2012).
40
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Figure 2. Annual Inflation. Constructed based on data obtained from National Bank of Ethiopia
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The Ethiopian economy is exposed to various exogenous shocks, such as volatilities in the
terms of trade, export demand, and aid inflows, suggesting a need for an adequate level of foreign
exchange reserve to smooth adjustment. These problems are fueled by the export structure, which
is dominated by agricultural goods whose international prices fluctuate greatly and whose outputs
are affected by periodic significant droughts. Coffee, oilseeds and chat account for 54.26% of total
export earning on average from 2008/09 to 2010/11 (NBE, 2010/11). Together with the risks of
oil price increment, these bottlenecks adversely influence the country’s current account.

Figure 3. Country’s current account. Constructed based on data obtained from National Bank of
Ethiopia
In the year 2007/08 the country had a huge trade imbalance (imports of $7.21 billion
compared to exports of $1.56), and a current-account deficit of 4% of GDP. In 2010/11 the current
account balance (including public transfers) registered USD 377.4 million in surplus against USD
174 million deficits in the preceding fiscal year. The main reason behind this improvement is
higher income from public and private transfers. From 2008/09 to 2010/11 public and private
transfers grew by 22% and 17% respectively. The external current account deficit (before official
transfers) has deteriorated from 5.2 percent of GDP in 2010/11 to 10.1 percent of GDP in 2011/12
(NBE, 2010/11). The improvement of current account balance in 2010/11 is reversed due to a
strong growth of imports in 2011/12. Despite a continued robust performance in the export of
goods and remittances in previous periods, strong consumer goods imports and the deteriorating
service balance in the first half of 2011/12, moved the current account into a deficit. This is in
contrast to the surplus recorded in 2010/11. Although capital account transactions are limited in
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Ethiopia, in 2010/11, the surplus in capital account reached USD 2.5 billion compared to USD 2
billion surpluses in the preceding fiscal year. This was attributed to strong growth in official long
term loan disbursements (33 percent) and estimated foreign direct investment inflows (30 percent).
In addition, aid inflows have also been large (about 5–7 percent of GDP) in the last few years
(NBE, 2010/11).
Model Specification
The empirical framework of this study is focused on modeling inflation and balance of
payments all together and evaluating the impact of government policies. In order to do so this
study employs VAR model. The rationale for using VAR model is that it can be hypothesized that
the variables studied in this research tends to affect each other intertemporally. In other words, the
possible existence of inter-temporal two way interaction amongst inflation and balance of
payments provides strong ground to use VAR model. Thus, each variable will have an equation
explaining its evolution based on its own lags and the lags of the other model variables. This intertemporal two way interaction is partly supported by scrutinizing the time series of the two
variables. As can be seen from the graph below, from 1997/98 to 2011/12 when the BOP keeps
deteriorating the inflation rate in contrary keeps rising. When the inflation rate reached its peak in
2008/09, the next year in 2009/10 the BOP account recorded the worst deficit of the last decade.
Moreover, in 2009/10 the inflation rate was the lowest of the past eight years whereas in the next
fiscal year 2010/11 Ethiopian BOP account registered its first surplus of the past fifteen years.
These empirical evidences support the hypothesis of possible existence of lagged value effect of
inflation on BOP and vice versa.
The argument of inter-temporal interaction can also be supported theoretically using
quantity theory of money (Steiner, 2009). From the quantity theory of money
Ms*V = P*Y……………………. (1)
where, M is money supply, v is velocity of money, P is price level, Y is output.
In log form (1) can be written as, m + v = p + y, rearranging
P = ms + v –y……………………. (2)
But From base money definition of money supply: Ms = m⋅ B , where B is base money and m is
money multiplier. B= NDA + NFA where NDA is Net Domestic Asset and NFA is Net
Foreign Asset held by the central bank. Incorporating this information, Ms can be written as
Ms = m⋅ (NDA + NFA )…….(3), taking differential of (3) gives as
dMs = dm + dnda + dnfa…………….(4), taking deferential of (2), assuming constant velocity
and making use of (4), we get
dP = dm + dnda+ dnfa – dy ……………… (5)
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Figure 4. Account without public transfer

Figure 5. Annual inflation
Equation (5) highlights the links between changes in international reserves and the price
level (Steiner, 2009). If the central bank does not sterilize, the increase in international reserves
directly translates into an increase of the price level Even if it’s sterilized, since a sterilization
operation expands the stock of domestic debt, policymakers might be tempted to reduce the
nominal value of the debt through surprise inflation.
On the other hand, Inflationary pressures influence balance of payment status of a nation.
Following traditional Keynesian macro approach, we can write the BOP equation as:
B=X-M+K …………………….. (6) Where X is export, M is import and K is capital account
balance. We can write the export and import equation as:
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X = b +aY + β P/pf ……………….. (7) Where, y-income,
and a>0, β<0
M= c + mY…………….. (8)

P/pf – relative price of local goods,

where m>0

Then substituting (7) and (8) into (6) we get;
B = aY+ β P/pf-m Y -(c-b)…………… (9)
Equation (9) implies that an increase in the inflation rate negatively influence1 the competitiveness
of the domestic economy in a way that import becomes cheaper and high while the quantity of
export decreases, which lead to balance of payment deterioration. Such interdependence between
the two main variables provides a fertile ground for using VAR model to study their relationship
and the impact of policy.
The Model
The VAR model is a multivariate time series specification developed as a generalization
of the univariate autoregressive (AR) model. Considering p-lags of Yt , the basic VAR(p) model
can be specified as follows
Yt = A1 Yt-1 + …+ Ap Yt-p + C’ D+ ut …………………… (10)
Where
Yt = (Y1t, Y2t, … Ykt)´ - K x 1 vector of vaiables
Dt = Vector of constant
ut = white noise, with E(Ut) = 0, E(utut´) = Σ, E(utu´t-k) = 0
A, C = are parameter matrices of suitable dimension
In order to choose the set of variables modeled in this study, besides inflation and balance
of payment, the study made use of structural, monetary and elasticity as well as absorption theories
of inflation and balance of payments respectively. Based on the above framework and theories the
following variables are chosen; inflation, balance of payments, budget deficit, domestic credit,
exchange rate, import price, and GDP.
Given this set of variables, the VAR model employed in this study is specified as follows;
in this setting the model is in line with those studied by Korsu (2001), Tafere (2008) and Geda and
Tafere (2011)
Zt = α + β1 Zt-1 + β2 Zt-2 + β3 Zt-3 + …. + βp Zt-p + Ut …………………. (11)
Where Zt is 7 x 1 vector of variables, ut is a k-dimensional unobservable zero mean white noise
process with positive definite var-covariance matrix, E(utut’) = Σu
1

Since β<0
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Analytical Approach and Estimation
The study uses data from African Development index of the World Bank and International
Financial Index of International monetary Fund (IMF) from 1976 to 2011. First, the variables are
tested for stationarity and based on the result, co-integration test is undertaken. Then, long run and
short run relationships are revealed. Formal testing for stationarity and the order of integration of
each variable are undertaken using ADF and Phillips-Peron tests. The result of Phillips-Peron test
is presented below whereas that of ADF test is presented in the Appendix.
Table 1
Philips-Peron test of Stationarity Result
Variable

With Constant

With Constant and Trend

At Level

First
At Level
Differenc
e
Bd
-2.934
-8.209*
-2.835
LNDc
-0.197
-5.696*
-2.784
LnExr
0.275
-5.448*
-2.140
Forex
0.029
-7.005*
-2.389
LNGdp
3.602
-4.580*
0.361
Imp
-0.443
-7.369*
-2.330
Inf
-2.621
-6.890*
-2.466
Note. Null: series have unit roots. *Significant at 1% level

First Difference

-8.268*
-5.607*
-5.550*
-7.310*
-5.495*
-7.923*
-7.447*

The results from the Philips-Peron test presented in table 1 demonstrate that all variables
are non-stationary in levels. However stationarity was achieved after differencing implying that
all the variables included in the model are integrated of order 1 or I(1). This finding triggers the
search for a long-run relationship amongst the variables which is done using the cointegration
technique. Test for co-integration (the Johansen Test) is often highly sensitive to the number of
lags included for the endogenous variables in the estimation of VAR. This stresses the importance
of testing for the optimal lag length. The optimal lag order is determined with the Final Prediction
Error (FPE), the Akaike Information Criterion, the Hannan-Quinin Information Criterion and the
Schwartz Information Criteria (SIC). The result is presented in the Appendix and can be seen that
all the FPE, AIC and HQIC suggest an optimal lag of three at 1% level of significance. Based on
the lag order selected, the presence and the number of co-integrating relationships are evaluated
with the trace and maximum Eigen value tests. The results are presented below and both the trace
and the maximal Eigen value tests imply the presence of three co-integrating relationships at 1%
level of significance.
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Table 2
Cointegration Rank Test
Test

Null
Hypothesis

Alternative
Hypothesis

Cointegration
Test Result

Critical
Value

Trace Statistic

H0: r<0
H0: r<1
H0: r<2
H0: r<3
H0: r<4

H1: r>0
H1: r>1
H1: r>2
H1: r>3
H1: r>4

265.0990*
147.6212*
91.8832*
47.3182
16.8496

133.57
103.18
76.07
54.46
35.65

Maximal Eigen
Value

H0: r=0

H1: r=1

117.4778*

51.57

H0: r=1
H1: r=2
55.7380*
45.10
H0: r=2
H1: r=3
44.5650*
38.77
H0: r=3
H1: r=4
30.4685
32.24
H0: r=4
H1: r=5
9.8009
20.97
Note. *Denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 1 percent level of significance.
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)
The Johansen test of co-integration indicates the presence of three co-integrating vector.
Although we find at least three co-integrating relationships, the interest in this study is to examine
the impact of financial policy instruments on inflation and balance of payment. The Johansen test
confirms the validity of selecting the three equations (of inflation, balance of payment and GDP)
by giving more weight to them, but in this study the focus will be on inflation and balance of
payment equations.
Long Run Analysis
The Inflation Equation
Table 3 presents the long run result for the inflation equation. From the long run equation
it can be concluded that inflation largely depends on all the variables in the model. The result
shows that the entire set of variables except budget deficit and exchange rate can explain inflation
in the long run.
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Table 3
Normalized cointegration equation of Inf2
Variable
Coefficient

Inf

C

Forex

LNExr

LNDc

Imp

LNGDP

BD

1

65.1252
[2.836]

-0.616279
[-2.402]

-1.481374
[-1.062]*

19.92753
[5.9591]

-6.68611
[-2.605]

25.59465
[6.914]

1.0412539
[1.031]*

Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics, *means insignificant at 1% significance level
The coefficient for foreign exchange reserve indicates that accumulation of foreign
exchange reserve (balance of payment improvement) brings an increment in the inflationary spiral
in the long run. A unit increase in foreign reserve leads to an increase in the inflation rate by 0.62
on average. This impact of changes in foreign reserve on inflation is not ignorable since the t ratio
of the coefficient is statically significant. This impact is often channeled via the impact that foreign
exchange reserve has on high powered money. This finding is in line with the theoretical prediction
of monetarist model which relates inflation exclusively to monetary variables.
The long run impact of domestic credit on inflation is found to be negative. Expansion of
credit disbursed to the private as well as public sector brought a decline in the inflation rate in the
economy. The result here suggests that a 1% increase in domestic credit in the long run lowers
inflation by about 0.199 units. Though significant, it didn’t confirm to the expected sign. The
reason for the negative sign reflects that most of the loan might be used for improving the supply
of goods and services.
Price of import and GDP all have the expected signs and the coefficients are significant.
As can be seen from the table import price has a positive impact on inflation in the long run. An
increase in import price by one unit leads to 6.7 units increase in the domestic inflation. This
indicates the presence of international price pass through effect in the Ethiopian inflation. The
coefficient of GDP is found to negative which implies that the two moves in opposite direction,
for a 1% increase in real income (GDP) inflation decreases by approximately 0.26 units. This is
consistent with studies by Dlamini (2008) in South Africa and Enoma (2011) in Nigeria.
The Balance of Payment Equation
Table 4 presents the long run equation estimated for balance of payment. The results show
that the main significant determinants of the balance of payments in the long run are exchange
rate, domestic credit, import price and GDP. Inflation, budget deficit and import price are found
to have insignificant impact in the long run at 1% significance level.

2

Interpretation of the coefficients is in a reverse sign as the table presents a normalized long run equation with all
the variables on one side of the equality
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Table 4
Normalized co-integration equation of Forex
Variable
Coefficient

Forex

C

Inf

LNExr

LNDc

Imp

LNGDP

BD

1

23.8972
[8.724]

1.62266
[-0.5013]*

-37.31307
[8.851]

14.51873
[6.662]

0.477024
[-1.332]*

-17.36781
[-7.727]

-0.669411
[-1.3476]*

Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics * means insignificant at 1% significance level
The results show that the long run impact of exchange rate is found to be positive as
expected. According to the coefficient estimates a 1% increase/decrease of exchange rate
(devaluation/appreciation) leads to an improvement in the balance of payment through increment
of foreign exchange reserve by 0.373 units. This result is consistent with that of Fekadu (2012) in
Ethiopia and Rincon (2010) in Colombia.
The coefficient of GDP is positive, which is in confirmation of the theoretical expectation.
The findings indicate that GDP has a positive effect on the balance of payments. A 1% increase in
GDP causes balance of payment to improve by 0.17 units. The implication is that, a country‘s
income plays a significant role for its foreign reserve. The positive impact of GDP is a sign of
export expansion. Increase in export makes the trade balance and balance of payments positive.
This empirical result confirms the findings of Eita and Gaomab’s study in Namibia (2012), Rincon
(2010) of Colombia and Korsu (2001) in Sierraleon.
Domestic credit, on the other hand, has negative impact on balance of payments, according
to the findings. This result is consistent with the argument of the monetary approach to BOP
provided that domestic credit expansion increases money supply in the economy. A 1%
expansion/contraction of domestic credit brings a decrease/increase of foreign reserve by 0.145
units and thus worsens the balance of payments. This result is consistent with a study by Adamu
and Itsede (2008) in which it was found that domestic credit affects balance of payment negatively.

Short Run Analysis
Table 5 presents the short run result from VECM. Equation 1 in table 5 shows the dInf
equation which contains the short run impact of domestic credit, exchange rate, foreign exchange
reserve, GDP and budget deficit on inflation. The coefficients of the one period lagged difference
in the table can be interpreted as the short run parameters representing the short run impact of the
respective variables. The result shows that foreign exchange reserve, domestic credit import price
and GDP have significant impact on inflation in the short run. Budget deficit is also found to be
significant. As the coefficient of dInft-1 indicates, in the short run, inflation in the current period is
quite sensitive to what it was in the previous period. A one unit increase in the inflation rate in the
current period leads to a further increase of 0.1873 in the next period on average.

16

http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/

Table 5
Short run result from VECM
Eq1 ( dInf)
Eq2 (dForex)
C
0.320
0.320
[2.140]
[-4.626]
dInft-1
0.183
-2.176
[2.786]
[3.460]
dForext-1
1.104
0.819
[3.064]
[2.853]
dLnExrt-1
21.851
1.773*
[4.003]
[0.513]
dLNDct-1
-3.388
-3.496
[0.251]
[-2.212]
dImpt-1
3.879
-0.635*
[3.782]
[1.228]
dLNGDPt-1
-99.962
-12.289
[-5.288]
[-2.986]
dBdt-1
4.476
-0.012*
[2.560]
[-0.531]
ECTt-1
-0.249
-0.128
[4.894]
[-5.139]
Note.* means insignificant at 1% significance level, the numbers in Parenthesis represent t-values
The coefficient of foreign exchange reserve implies the existence of a positive significant
causal effect on inflation by changes in foreign exchange reserve, suggesting that excess
accumulation of foreign exchange reserve could fuel inflationary pressures in the economy. The
short run coefficient of GDP is found to be negative and significant. An increase in GDP of 1%,
on average, leads to 0.999 point increase in the inflation rate during the period 1976-2010. The
results are consistent with economic theory as a fall in output tends to slow down economic growth
and trigger inflation in extreme cases. This finding for Gross Domestic Product is consistent with
that of Dlamini (2008) finding in South Africa.
Domestic credit has a negative impact on inflation in the short run. Inflation reduces, on
average, by 0.22 units for an expansion of domestic credit by 1%. But this impact is statistically
insignificant. Inflation reduces, on average, by 0.22 units for an expansion of domestic credit by
1%. This result is consistent with the view that in the absence of a well-developed financial sector
the transmission of credit expansion might take longer than what would be with well-developed
financial sector. Ethiopia is deprived of well-developed financial system. Thus the effect of credit
expansion may not be reflected in prices very fast. Unlike the long run case, budget deficit is
important in explaining inflation in the short run. An increase in deficit by one unit leads to an
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increment in the inflation rate by 4.476 units. This parallels the findings of Korsu (2001) that fiscal
imbalance is disinflationary.
Exchange rate and import price are significant in explaining inflation in the short run.
Import price is found to be inflationary with a unit increase in price of imported goods and services
will increase domestic inflation by 3.9. Exchange rate has inflationary effect in the short run too.
A percentage point change in exchange rate brought about 0.22 units change in inflation in the
same direction. This findings are consistent with the results of (Tafere, 2008) Korsu (2001), Biru
(2005). The coefficient of the error correction term is interpreted as speed of adjustment to long
run equilibrium. The coefficient of the error correction term of the inflation equation is less than
unity and negative. This guarantees that although the actual inflation mat temporarily deviate from
its long run equilibrium value, it would gradually converge to its equilibrium. However, the speed
of adjustment to restore long run equilibrium is quite low, which is 24.9% per year and it will take
almost four years to completely recover from a single shock and restore long run equilibrium.
Equation 2 in table 5 shows the short run equation for balance of payment, dForex. Inflation
here is found to have negative and significant impact on balance of payment. One unit decrease/
Increase in the inflation rate causes increase/decrease in foreign exchange reserve by about 2.2
units. The balance of payments deteriorate with domestic inflation because it may stimulate import
spending, given that imports appear relatively cheaper or it may decrease export sales as exports
appear more expensive abroad. Though significant, past foreign exchange reserve has got very
small influence on current period reserve (about 0.819). The coefficient of exchange rate implies
it has insignificant impact on the balance of payments in the short run. This result is not surprising
because it takes more time for exporters and importers to adjust their transaction to the depreciation
or appreciation of the exchange rate. This result is not at variant with the findings of Korsu (2001).
The coefficient of domestic credit indicates that this variable has significant but very small
impact on balance of payment in the short run. 1% change in domestic credit brings a change in
the balance of payment by 0.035 units. GDP is found to have significant but negative influence in
the short run. As we noted before, real GDP could affect balance of payment from two sides.
Increased GDP could be a sign of increased export (positive impact) or it could be a sign of faster
import growth (negative impact). The negative relation between GDP and Balance of payments
obtained in the short run indicates the latter effect outweighs the former.
The coefficient of the error correction term for the balance of payment equation is negative
and significant, implying it is error correcting. This result ensures that foreign exchange reserve
(which serve as a proxy for balance of payment) convergences to its long run equilibrium. The
speed of adjustment however is slow, around 12.8% annually, as shown by the adjustment
coefficient. Every year only just over 12% of the disequilibrium is adjusted.
Granger Causality Test
The Granger causality test is used to examine the existence of bidirectional causality among
the given variables. According to table 6 there is bidirectional causality among inflation and
foreign exchange reserve. Inflation Granger causes foreign exchange reserve changes and foreign
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reserve changes Granger causes inflation. The existence of dynamic interaction among these
variables confirms the appropriateness of using VAR model and the Johansen procedure. The table
also implies that foreign exchange reserve Granger causes budget deficit and domestic credit
whereas inflation Granger causes GDP, domestic credit and budget deficit. Import price Granger
causes inflation and exchange rate. Domestic credit Granger causes GDP and inflation while
exchange rate Granger causes GDP, domestic credit and import price. Budget deficit and GDP
Granger causes all the variables except exchange rate and import price.
Table 6
Results of Granger causality tests
Equation
Excluded
Forex

Forex

LNGdp

13.927
(0.003)
12.691
(0.005)
4.7872
(0.188)
0.5334
(0.912)
5.2568
(0.154)
14.144
(0.011)

Inf
LNDc
LnExr
Imp
Bd

LNGdp

Inf

LNDc

LnExr

Imp

Bd

2.984
(0.394)

3.6294
(0.034)
18.6
(0.001)

11.605
(0.009)
3.7799
(0.028)
7.1377
(0.068)

3.1906
(0.363)
6.2299
(0.101)
0.81786
(0.845)
1.6512
(0.648)

3.7193
(0.293)
8.182
(0.939)
8.335
(0.415)
4.038
(0.304)
13.547
(0.004)

14.305
(0.003)
10.653
(0.014)
12.889
(0.005)
1.3789
(0.710)
11.058
(0.601)
1.0466
(0.790)

11.062
(0.001)
16.486
(0.001)
19.9835
(0.000)
6.6238
(0.702)
9.7712
(0.021)

2.8522
(0.045)
2.233
(0.525)
0.40513
(0.039)
6.2853
(0.099)

1388.5
(0.005)
9.1551
(0.207)
15.12
(0.002)

1.4132
(0.021)
2.2802
(0.516)

2.0282
(0.567)

Conclusion
The empirical estimations imply that there is a tradeoff between inflation and balance of
payment condition. Too much accumulation of foreign exchange reserve fuels the inflationary
pressure, thus sterilization is highly recommended. Moreover, since domestic credit is found to
affect inflation negatively and balance of payment positively in the short run, this sterilization
ought to take in a way that increase credit extended to the domestic sector. Besides, the existence
of two way relationships between inflation and balance of payments stresses that any policy
interventions aimed at stabilizing the economy need to take into account the priorities of the
government. This is essential in that the choice of policy instruments may bring forward tradeoff
between external balance with inflationary pressures. Regarding policy instruments available to
the government, exchange rate is found to have insignificant impact thus to better utilize this policy
tool, diversifying the export structure would be complementary. By doing so, the country’s export
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demand and supply would become more responsive to changes in the exchange rate. Additionally,
it is found that GDP growth effectively reduces inflation both in the short run as well as long run,
and also it improves Balance of Payments in the long run. Thus, fostering the country’s economic
growth is essential but its orientation should be switched to export promotion as the import
orientation of the country's foreign market activity makes the economy vulnerable to foreign
inflation.
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Appendices
Table A1
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Stationarity test Result
Variable

Bd
LNDc
Ln Exr
Forex
LNGdp
Imp
Inf

With Constant
At Level
-2.8816
-0.4103
0.2789
1.5987
2.1811
-0.9080
-2.5056

With Constant and trend

First Difference
-8.2416*
-5.6760*
-5.4193*
-4.8524*
-4.6519*
-5.7326*
-6.3221*

At Level
-2.7742
-2.2479
-2.0528
-0.8139
-0.2285
-2.4775
-2.3936

First difference
-8.2247*
-5.5952*
-5.5283*
-5.8434*
-5.4066*
-6.4685*
-6.8429*

MacKinnon critical values
1%
-3.43
-3.96
5%
-2.86
-3.41
Note. Null hypothesis: series have unit roots. *Significant at 1% level

Table A2
Optimal lag order Selection
Lag

LR

FPE

AIC

HQIC

SBIC

0
1
2
3

NA
62.532
21.211
33.216*

14.7669
3.76404
3.59737
2.47686*

11.1983
9.80665
9.7063
9.23081*

11.426
10.171
10.2073
9.86849*

11.8853
10.9059*
11.2178
11.1546
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Figure A1. Inverse roots of the AR characteristic polynomial
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Abstract
This study carries out the impact evaluation of Farmer Field School (FFS) training program
on the technical efficiency of smallholder farmers. The FFS program was sponsored by
the Ethiopian government and launched in 2010 to scale-up best agricultural practices in
the country. The study aims to compare changes in the technical efficiency of those FFS
graduate and non-FFS graduate maize producing farmers in Ethiopia, Oromia. For this,
panel data were collected in two rounds from 446 randomly selected households from three
districts consisting of 218 FFS graduate farmers and 228 non-FFS graduate farmers. The
analytical procedure has involved three stages: in the first stage, descriptive analyses were
used to detect existence of the difference in the outcome indicators between the two farmer
groups. In the second stage, we have applied a semi-parametric impact evaluation method
of propensity score matching with several matching algorithms to estimate the program
impact. In the third stage, we used Difference-in-Difference as robustness check in
detecting causality between program intervention and the technical efficiency. The
combined uses of these alternative estimation techniques indicate that the program has a
negative impact on the technical efficiency of the FFS graduates. Numerous plausible
explanations for this outcome are discussed, and recommendations for improvements are
suggested accordingly.
Key words: impact evaluation, technical efficiency, propensity score matching.

The agricultural sector has always been an important component of the Ethiopian economy.
During 2012/13, agriculture accounted for 42.7 percent of the gross national product (GDP), 80
percent of employment and over 70 percent of total national foreign exchange earnings. In contrast,
industry and service sector accounted for 12.3 and 45 percent of GDP, respectively, during the
same period (MoFED, 2014).
A unique feature of Ethiopian agriculture is the role of smallholder farms in the total
national output production and labour employment. For example, of the total production of 251
million quintals in 2012/13, about 96 percent (241 million quintal) was produced by the
smallholder farmers and the rest 4 percent (10 million quintal) was produced by commercial farms.
On the average, land holding share of 83 percent by smallholders farming setup is less than 2
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hectares and the average size of the small farms is about 1.25 hectare in Ethiopia. These data
clearly denote that small farms are the main sources of the production and employment generation
in Ethiopia. Evidence also suggest that small farms provide a more equitable distribution of income
and an effective demand structure for other sectors of the economy (Bravo-Ureta and Evenson
1994). Thus, the current strategic focus on increasing the productivity and production of
smallholder farmers in socio-economic development of the country is justified.
Accordingly, the Ethiopian government has issued agricultural policy and investment
frame-work (PIF). PIF provides a clear statement of the goals and development objectives of the
country spanning the roughly ten years between 2010 and 2020. The development objective, as
stated in the policy document, aims to sustainably increase rural incomes and national food security
through increased production and productivity. To this end, farmer field school training is
considered as the best strategy to scale up the best practices used by the model smallholder farmers
whose productivity is more than two times higher than the average (FDRE, 2010).
The aim of FFS is to give special training to some purposively selected ‘model farmers,’
who, in turn, are supposed to transfer the knowledge to the rest through their farmers’ networks
that are administratively organized rather than using the existing social relationship. Accordingly,
the selection of the ‘model farmers’ into the training program was made by the district level
government officials in collaboration with the Kebele level (the lowest administrative unit in
Ethiopia) development agents. Although there was no as such transparent criterion guiding the
selections of the model farmers, the past performance of the farmers with adoption of technological
packages, agricultural production outputs, accessibility of the farmers in terms of geographical
location and educational level were mainly considered as selection criteria. Ultimately, those who
were administratively sampled attended all the training sessions lasting for 15 days. There was a
minimum of eight hours of training per day thereby making the total of 120 hours of training. After
the completion of the model farmers’ training, there were again series of meetings held with all
farmers within each Kebele with the aim of briefing the essences of the training and how to
organize all farmers into 1 to 5 network called “sub-development team” so as to facilitate the
diffusion of knowledge and best practices from the FFS participant model farmers from now
onwards, referred to as “FFS graduates” to non FFS participants. The desired outcome of FFS was
to increase technology adoption and technical efficiency of the smallholder farmers as means to
increase their production and productivity. In effect, policymakers have focused their attention on
increasing the adoption of new technologies and improving their technical efficiency as means to
increase smallholder farmers’ productivity and crop income.
However, the prices of new technologies are increasing in the face of capricious output
prices and declining farm holding sizes which discourage such technology adoptions. Furthermore,
presence of possible technical inefficiency means that output can be increased without the need
for new technology. If there appears significant inefficiency among the smallholder farmers, then,
the agricultural policy should gear towards training them on how to increase their efficiency with
the existing technology. Increasing the adoption of more expensive agricultural technology may
result in liquidating the existing meager assets of the rural producers with very little productivity

24

http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/

gain. This calls for increasing productivity and production through optimum and efficient uses of
existing technologies (Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro 1993). However, studies that systematically
analyze the impacts of FFS on technical efficiency of the smallholder farmers are lacking.
Therefore, this study aims to fill this knowledge gap. To this end, the paper aims to empirically
examine the impact of FFS on the technical efficiency of the two farmer group. We have employed
two estimation methods: Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Difference-in-Difference (DID).
The former method helps to match program participating farmers and non-participating farmers
based on their baseline similarities and clear out those factors to single out only program impacts.
The later approach (DID) help to difference out unobservable factors from the impact analysis
process.
Materials and Methods
Study area and sampling
This study was conducted in three purposively selected major maize producer districts in
the Oromia region, East Wollega zone: Guto Gida, Gida Ayana and Boneya Boshe districts. These
three districts were purposively selected from the zone on the basis of their land under maize
production and the role that maize plays in their socio-economic developments. In these areas,
cultivation of maize crop occupies an important place in the crop production plan of the farmers.
For this study, maize crop is purposively selected because of the fact that it is Ethiopian's largest
cereal commodity in terms of total production, productivity, and the number of its smallholder
coverage (IFPRI, 2010).
Sample size
Following the procedures employed by IDB (2010) and World Bank (2007), we have
employed power analysis for sample size determination and selected equal number of 246
smallholder farmers both from FFS graduates and non FFS graduates thereby making total sample
size of 492.
Sampling strategy
First, we have selected three districts with good maize growing records. Second, from each
district, we have purposively selected one kebele, from which households were randomly selected.
Following the FFS program design, we have stratified our households from each Kebele into two
excludable groups as: (a) FFS graduate farmers who were selected for the FFS training program,
and; (b), non-FFS graduate farmers who were exposed to the FFS training via the FFS graduates
and hence supposed to follow their best practices. Finally, we made six sampling frame for the
three kebeles since we have two strata in each kebele. Stratified probability-proportional-to-size
sampling offers the possibility of greater accuracy by ensuring that the groups that are created by
a stratifying criterion are represented in the same proportions as in the population (Bryman, 1988).
Accordingly, we have divided the total samples of 492 across the Kebeles as well as between the
FFS graduates and non-FFS graduates following probability-proportional-to-size sampling
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technique. However, although 492 questionnaires were distributed to the sampled households, we
have collected 446 properly filled questionnaires with distribution across the selected study
districts as 142, 160 and 144 from Guto Gida, Gida Ayana and Boneya Boshe districts respectively.
Data Sources and Collection Techniques
Data collection was classified into two stages. In the first stage, qualitative data were
collected using key informant interviews and focus group discussions. In the second stage, detailed
quantitative data were collected using structured questionnaires prepared with full understanding
of the nature of the program. The questionnaires were pre-tested and ensured that all included
items were relevant and the questionnaire contained the correct format for the data collection. The
survey was conducted in two rounds using the same questionnaire format, the same enumerators
and during the same season of June to July in 2012 and 2013.
Estimation of Technical Efficiency
Stochastic frontier production function is widely proposed efficiency measures for the
analysis of farm-level data (Farrel, 1957; Battese, 1995; Bamlaku et al., 2009). Thus, we have used
the technical efficiency model specified by (Battese and Coelli, 1995) which allows a stochastic
frontier production function for panel data with farmer effects that can vary systematically over
time and are assumed to be distributed as truncated normal random variables. The model can be
specified as:

Yit  X it   (Vit Uit ) i 1,2,.....N , t 1,2,.. .......T ..........(1)
Where, Yit is the logarithm of the production of the i-th household in the t-th time period, X it is
vector of values of known functions of inputs of production and other explanatory variables
associated with the i-th firm at the t-th observation; and  is a vector of unknown parameters.
Here, the error term comprises two separate parts, Vit are random variables outside the control of
the households which affects the productivity of the households and assumed to be identically and
independently distributed (iid) N (0, v 2 ) and independent from U it ; U it represents factors
contributing towards technical inefficiency but which are supposed to be within the control of the
households.
The measure of technical efficiency is equivalent to the ratio of the production of the i-th
household in the t-th time period to the corresponding production value of the frontier household
whose U i is zero. Thus, it follows that given the specifications of the stochastic frontier production
function defined by equation (1), the technical efficiency of the i-th household in the t-th time
period can be defined by:

TEit  ( X it   v it  U it ) / ( X it   v it )  ( X it   U it ) / ( X it  )   U it ....(2)
Where U it and X it  are defined by the specifications of the model in equation (1). In this study,
Cobb-Douglas stochastic frontier production function, which is the most commonly used model,
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is considered to be the appropriate model for the analysis of the technical efficiency of the farmers.
On the basis of panel data, equation (1) above can be expressed in the following form:
b

b

V

Yit = A Lit L Kit K e it e

-U it

Where

...................................(3)

Vit

follows

N (0,  v ) and U it follows a half or truncated normal distribution at zero. Taking natural log on
2

both sides of equation (3), the following equation is obtained:

ln Yit  ln A   L ln Lit   K ln Kit  ( Vit Uit )..........................(4)
Finally, the following equation was estimated by the computer programme FRONTIER 4.1
developed by Coelli (1994) that computes the parameters estimates by iteratively maximizing a
nonlinear function of the unknown parameters in the model subject to the constraints.
ln(Yit) =  0it + 1it lnX1it +  2 it lnX 2it + 3it X 3i + 4 it lnX 4it+

 5it X 5it+ 6it X 6it+ 7 it X 7 it+8it X8it+Vit - Uit....................(5)
Where, βi's are parameters to be estimated (coefficients) of inputs to be estimated by maximum
likelihood estimation method (MLE). Here, the βi’s refer to output elasticity. Ln is natural
logarithm, Yit is denotes the production in (kg) at the t-th observation (t = 1,2,..., T) for the i-th
farmer (i= 1,2,..., N); X1it is maize farm size (ha), X2it is human labor (man-days), X3it is oxen
labour used (oxen-days), X4it is DAP fertilizer used (kg), X5it is urea fertilizer used (kg), X6it is
improved seed used (kg), X7it is compost used (quintal), X8it represents year of observation; v are
assumed to be iid N (0,



2
v

) random errors, independently distributed of the

 s,
it

Uit represents

technical inefficiency effects independent of Vi, and have half normal distribution with mean zero
and constant variance while i shows households during the time t year. Battese and Coelli, (1995)
noted that the year variable in the stochastic frontier accounts for Hicksian neutral technological
change.
Following Battese and Coelli (1995) model, the mean of farm-specific technical
inefficiency Ui, is also defined as:

u    z  z  z  z  z  z  z  z  z
 z   z   z   z   z   z   z   z  w .....(6)
it

0

10 it

10it

1it

1it

11it

2 it

11it

2it

12 it

3it

12it

3it

13it

4 it

13it

4it

5it

14it

5it

14it

6 it

15it

15it

6it

7 it

16it

7 it

16it

8it

8it

9 it

17 it

17 it

it

9it

Where Z1 is age of the farmers (years) during the year, Z2 is gender of household head [1 male, 0
otherwise] , Z3 is marital status of household [1 married, 0 otherwise], Z4 represents that the
household head can read and write [1 yes, 0 otherwise], Z5 is educational level of household head
(years of schooling), Z6 farming experience of household head (years), Z7 is family size, Z8 is
average annual non farm income (Birr), Z9 is household head has radio [1 yes, 0 otherwise], Z10
shows that the household has land use certificate [ 1, yes; 0 otherwise], Z11 is total land size of the
household (hectare), Z12 is distance of household residence from the technology distribution center
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(hours), Z13 is average annual development agents visit to the house hold (number), Z14 is plough
frequency of maize land (number), Z15 represents Guto Gida district [1 Guto Gida, 0 otherwise],
Z16 represents Gida Ayana district [1 Gida Ayana, 0 otherwise], Z17 represents year of
observations, Wit, is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean and
variance,



2

, and δs are parameters to be estimated. Here, the year variable in the inefficiency

model (6) specifies that the inefficiency effects may change linearly with respect to time. This is
because “the distributional assumptions on the inefficiency effects permit the effects of technical
change and time-varying behavior of the inefficiency effects to be identified in addition to the
intercept parameters,

0it

and



0

, in the stochastic frontier and the inefficiency model” (Battese

and Coelli, 1995).
Analytical Approach
The main challenge of this study, as it is the case for other impact evaluation studies, is to
decide on the correct counterfactual: what would have happened to the level technical efficiency
of those farmers who participated in the training program if the program had not existed? Given
the non-random selection of farmers for the program participation, estimating the outcome
variables by using the OLS would yield biased and inconsistent estimate of the program impact
due to some confounding factors: purposive program placement, self-selection into the program,
and diffusion of knowledge among the program participant and non-participant farmers. Thus, our
impact evaluation design should enable us to control for such possible biases.
For this, we have employed two impact assessment methods: Propensity Score Matching
(PSM) and Difference-in-Difference (DID). The former method helps to match program
participating farmers and non-participating farmers based on their baseline similarities and clear
out those factors to single out only program impacts while the later approach (DID) helps to
difference out unobservable factors from the impact analysis process. The combined use of these
alternative estimation techniques is expected to lead to consistent results.
Propensity score matching (PSM).
In the absence of random selections, those farmers who participated in the FFS training
and those excluded from it may differ not only in their participation status but also in other
characteristics that affect both participation and the agricultural productivity and technical
efficiency of the farmers. The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) seeks to find non-participating
farmers among farmers not receiving the training that are similar to the participating farmers, but
did not participated in the training program. PSM does this by matching participating farmers to
non-participated farmers using propensity scores. In other words, this approach tries to replicate
the training selection process as long as the selection is based on observable factors (EssamaNssah, 2006; Ravallion, 2008; World Bank 2010; IDB, 2010). Thus, PSM searches a group of
“control” farmers who are statistically “similar” in all observed characteristics to those who
participated in the training program.
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Under certain assumptions, matching on Propensity Score, P(X), is as good as matching on
X. Therefore, rather than attempting to match on all values of the variables, cases can be compared
on the basis of propensity scores alone, given that all observable variables which influences
program participation and outcome of interest are properly identified and included (for further
explanations on PSM, please see, Essama-Nssah, 2006; Heinrich et al., 2010; World Bank, 2010).
PSM constructs a statistical comparison group that is based on a model of the probability
of participating in the treatment T conditional on observed characteristics X, or the
propensity score is given by:
P( x)  pr (T  1| x)........................................................................(7)
The
propensity score or conditional probability of participation may be calculated by using a probit or
a logit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable T equal to one if the farmer
participated in the FFS training and zero otherwise (Ravallion, 2008; World Bank, 2010; IDB,
2010). Although the results are similar to what would have been obtained by using probit, we have
used logit model to estimate participation equation in this thesis.
However, in order to determine if matching is likely to effectively reduce selection bias, it
is crucial to understand the two underlying assumptions under which the PSM is most likely to
work: Conditional Independence Assumption and Common Support Assumption.
Conditional Independence Assumption.
This states that given a set of observable covariates X which are not affected by the program
intervention; potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment. If
outcomes for participants and

Y

0

Y represents
1

outcomes for non-participants, conditional independence imply:

(Y 1,Y 0)  T i| X i......................................................................................(8)

This implies that selection is solely based on observable characteristics and that all variables that
influence treatment assignment and potential outcomes are simultaneously observed by the
researcher. Put in other words, after controlling for X, the participation assignment is “as good as
random” and participation in the FFS training program is not affected by the outcomes of interest
(Imbens, 2004; Ravallion, 2008; World Bank, 2010; IDB, 2010). This allows the non-participating
households to be used to construct a counterfactual for the participating group. This assumption is
sometimes called exogeneity or unconfoundedness assumption or ignorable treatment assignment
(Imbens, 2004).
Clearly, this is a strong assumption since it implies that uptake of the program is based
entirely on observed characteristics, and hence has to be justified by the nature of the program and
data quality at hand. Although the nature of the program enabled us to justify that its uptake is
based mainly on observable characteristics, we may relax such un-confoundedness assumption
since we are interested in the mean impact of the program for the participants only (Imbens, 2004;
Essama-Nssah, 2006; Ravallion, 2008; World Bank, 2010).

Y

0

 T i| X i....................................................................................................(9)
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This equation states that, the outcome in the counterfactual state is independent of participation,
given the observable characteristics. Thus, once controlled for the observables, outcomes for the
non-participant represent what the participants would have experienced had they not participated
in the program.

Common Support Assumption.
This assumption states that for matching to be feasible, there must be individuals in the
comparison group with the same value of covariates as the participants of interest. It requires an
overlap in the distributions of the covariates between participants and non-participant comparison
groups. This assumption is expressed as:
0< Pr(T  1|x)<1......................................................................................(10)

This equation implies that the probability of receiving FFS training for each value of X lies between
0 and 1. It ensures that persons with the same X values have a positive probability of being both
participants and non-participants (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1998; Imbens, 2004; Ravallion,
2008). More strongly, it implies the necessity of existence of a non-participant analogue for each
participant household and existence of a participant household for each non-participant household.
However, since we are interested in estimating the mean effect of the intervention for the
participants, as opposed to the mean effect for the entire population, we will use a weaker version
of the overlap assumption which is expressed as:
P( x)  Pr(T  1|x)<1................................................................................(11)

This equation implies the possible existence of a non-participant analogue for each participant. It
would be impossible to find matches for a fraction of program participants if this condition is not
met. Thus, it is recommended to restrict matching and hence the estimation of the program effect
on the region of common support. This implies using only non-participants whose propensity
scores overlap with those of the participants. In sum, participating farmers will therefore have to
be “similar” to non-participating farmers in terms of observed characteristics unaffected by
participation; thus, some non-participating farmers may have to be dropped to ensure
comparability (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998; Ravallion, 2008).
The main purpose of the propensity score estimation is to balance the observed distributions
of covariates across two farmer groups (FFS graduates vs. non-FFS graduates) farmers. Hence, we
need to ascertain that (1) there is sufficient common support region (overlapping of the estimated
propensity scores) for the two groups of farmers, and; (2) the differences in the covariates in the
matched two groups have been eliminated. These two issues are the necessary conditions for the
reliability of the subsequent estimate of the program impacts. Although there are many methods
of covariate balancing tests, literatures show that the standardized tests of mean differences is the
most commonly applied method. Hence, we have employed two methods for this thesis:
standardized tests of mean differences and testing for the joint equality of covariate means between
groups using the Hotelling test or F-test. The following equation shows the formula used to
calculate standardized tests of mean differences (Imbens, 2004).
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B

before

( x)  100.

Where for each covariate,
comparison groups, X
comparison groups, and

TM

X TX C
[ V T ( X ) V C ( X ) ]
2

XT

and X

VT

(X )

,B

after

( x)  100.

X TM  X CM ...(12)
[ V T ( X ) V
]
C(X )

2

and X are the sample means for the full treatment and
are the sample means for the matched treatment and
C

CM

and Vc ( x ) are the corresponding sample variances. Rosenbaum and

Rubin (1985) suggest that a standardized mean difference of greater than 20 percent should be
considered as “large” and a suggestion that the matching process has failed. In addition to test of
covariate balancing, we have also checked that there is sufficient overlap in the estimated
propensity scores of the two groups of farmers after matching.
Given that the above specified assumptions holds, and there is a sizable overlap in P(X)
across participants and non-participants, the PSM estimator for the average program effect on the
treated (ATT) can be specified as the mean difference in Y over the common support, weighting
the comparison units by the propensity score distribution of participants (Caliendo and Kopeinig,
2005; World Bank, 2010). A typical cross-section estimator can be specified as follows:

ATT

PSM



 E p ( x )|T 1, E Y 1|T  1, p(x)   E Y 0|T  0, p(x) 

...........................(13)

This equation shows that, PSM estimator is simply the mean difference in outcomes over the
common support, appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants.
Difference in Difference (DID)
Unlike the propensity score matching, DID assume that program participation is influenced
by unobserved household heterogeneity and that such factors are time invariant. Having data
collected for both before and after the program on both farmer groups, the unobservable time
invariant component can be differenced out by using DID. Accordingly, this section assesses the
impact of FFS program on technical efficiency of the farmers using DID.
With a two-period panel data set, impact evaluation using DID method can be estimated
just by pooling the two periods’ data and use OLS to estimate the performance parameters (Feder,
et at., 2004; Lifeng, 2010; World Bank, 2010). To specify the equation, assume that a farmer (i)
lives in village (j) at a time (t) reporting performance of y, while x and z representing the household
and village characteristics that changes over time.

ln Yijt   0   D t   FFSijt   x ijt  zijt  i   j   ijt ................(14)
Where,

D

t

is dummy variable for the second year after the FFS program, FFS showing dummy

variable (one if the household is FFS graduate and zero otherwise), i and

 j representing

unobserved, time constant factors influencing program participation in household and village
respectively while

 ijt showing idiosyncratic error representing the unobservable factors that

changes over time. However, given the non random selections of the farmers into the FFS training
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program, just the naïve estimation of the program impact using OLS may yield biased estimates
for the reason that

i and  j may be correlated with some of the explanatory variables thereby

violating one of the fundamental assumptions of OLS. Thus, by subtracting the first period
observations from the second period observations, equation 8 above can be condensed as:

 ln Yijt     FFSijt   x ijt zijt   ijt ................(15)
The symbol (  ) in equation 15 above shows the differencing operator between the two periods,
while both

i

and

 j were eliminated by differencing. The dummy variable for the year of

observation is also eliminated after differencing. Thus,  measures the before FFS training
growth rate in performance for all farmer groups, while  measures the difference in growth rate
between the FFS graduates and non FFS graduates after the FFS training program. Note that DID
estimator provides unbiased FFS effects under the identifying assumption that change in outcome
variable, y, for all groups of farmers would have been the same in the absence of the program
although the level of y in any given year may differ (Feder, et al., 2004; World Bank, 2010). Thus,
the quality of the DID estimator is that the differencing enabled us to control for the initial
conditions that may have a separate influence on the subsequent changes in outcome or assignment
to the treatment. As the result, any variations in performance owing to such factors (systemic
climate change, price and other policy changes) that affect all farmers are eliminated and hence
the individual coefficients in the model actually measure the contributions of each explanatory
variable to the growth of the performance indicators.
Significance of the study
This study has enormous academic contributions. It has unique contributions in that it
employs propensity score matching (PSM) and difference in difference (DID) impact assessment
methods attempting to supplement the limitation of the first method by the later. To the best of
our knowledge, this study is the first to combine Psmatch2 and Pscore stata commands with four
different matching algorithms attempting to ensure the robustness of the estimated program
impacts.
Results and Discussion
This section presents the survey results and discussions by dividing it into sections. In the
first section, comparison of some selected household characteristics and maize production
parameters for the baseline year is made by farmer groups so as to verify the similarities of the
samples. Section two presents comparison of major input and output performance indicators
between the FFS graduates and non-FFS graduate farmers before the implementation of the
program. Section three presents comparisons of before and after the program was implemented by
farmer groups on the basis of some selected performance indicators followed by section four
presenting FFS impact assessments by farmer groups using PSM. Section five extends the impact
assessment further by using DID method.
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Table1
Household and farm characteristics during 2010 (by farmer groups)
Mean
Non-FFS Graduate
38.776
0.87719
1.3684
0.36842
21.395

t-test
t
-1.220
1.750
6.940
7.950
-1.010

Variables
FFS graduate
Household head age
37.651
Household head sex
0.92661
Education level of head
3.211
Household head literate
0.72018
Farming Experience of
20.472
head
None farm income
1276.6
824.12
1.720
Family size
5.7569
5.2895
2.180
Distance from techno
0.71353
0.76096
-0.720
center
Distance from district
6.8145
7.1766
-0.800
town
Have a pair of oxen
0.73394
0.65789
1.750
Have mobile cell phone
0.33028
0.2193
2.640
Have a radio (yes=1)
0.46789
0.39035
1.660
Estimated asset value
18149
13479
2.040
Household land size
2.0753
1.6758
2.710
(Ha)
Have land use certificate
0.83871
0.78947
1.330
Head is member of
0.84862
0.69737
3.860
cooperative
Head received FTC
0.36697
0.30263
1.440
training
Number of DA
9.5826
6.5965
2.470
contact/year
Oxen labour (Oxen
13.528
10.43
3.680
day/Ha)
Total maize farm (Ha)
1.4463
1.1012
3.620
Percent of maize land to total
86.4000
89.600
0.398
Note. Source: Own calculation from survey data of June to July, 2012.

p>|t|
0.222
0.081
0.000
0.000
0.315
0.087
0.030
0.473
0.422
0.082
0.009
0.099
0.042
0.007
0.183
0.000
0.151
0.014
0.000
0.000
0.691

Household and Farm Characteristics by Farmer Groups
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for both FFS graduates and non-FFS graduate
farmers. Almost in all the cases, FFS graduates had the highest scores in terms of educational

International Journal of African Development v.3 n.3 Fall 2015

33

levels, non-farm income, family sizes, estimates of asset values, total land size as well as percent
of farm size covered by maize. Significant differences were also observed in the proportions of
household owning mobile cell phone, radio ownership, participation in farmers training center,
participation in farmers cooperatives, as well as number of contacts with the Kebele level
development agent as those FFS graduate farmers had the highest scores than those non-FFS
graduate farmers in all cases. In a sharp contrast with the FFS graduate farmers, non-FFS farmers
are found at more distance from such important locations as centers for farm technology
distributions and from their respective district offices.
Such significant difference between the farmers groups was not just the result of nonrandom selection of the farmers into the FFS training program. Rather, it was the result of the
intended principles of selection criteria followed by the government. As the result, although there
was no as such transparent criterion guiding the selections of the model farmers, the educational
level of the farmers, the past performance of the farmers with adoption of technological packages,
agricultural production outputs, accessibility of the farmers in terms of geographical location and
history of participation in farmers training centers were some of the factors considered in selecting
the participant farmers.

Table 2
Costs and returns of maize production before the FFS training
Mean
t-test
FFS Graduate
Non FFS Graduate
t
p>|t|
6323.3
4550.7
3.590
0.000
4048.147
3737.4
1.7977
0.0729
0.6176
0.5676
2.1280
0.0339

Variable
Total maize (kg)
Maize yield (kg/ha)
Technical Efficiency
(index)
Accounting income(Br)
9795.7
6753.4
Accounting income/ha
6870.7
6241.5
Economic income
7972.3
5262.8
Economic income/ha
5422.2
4748.7
DAP/ha (kg)
78.893
80.401
UREA/ha (kg)
80.547
80.401
Total cost/ha
3807.1
3693.7
Total labor/ha
55.794
56.047
Cash cost/ha
2358.7
2200.9
Non cash cost/ha
1448.5
1492.9
Family labor/ha
46.635
48.329
Source: Own calculation from survey data of June to July, 2012.
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3.810
1.670
3.600
1.890
-0.450
0.040
0.820
-0.110
1.360
-0.620
-0.680

0.000
0.096
0.000
0.060
0.656
0.967
0.412
0.912
0.174
0.537
0.496
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Cost and Returns of Maize Production by Farmer Groups
Table 2 presents cost and returns of maize production by farmers’ groups. Comparison of
costs and returns among the two farmers groups shows that FFS graduate farmers had significant
differences from their counterpart, non-FFS graduate farmers, specifically in terms of total maize
obtained, technical efficiency, and income from maize production measured both in terms of
accounting and economic profits. However, the difference between the two farmer groups
diminishes as we compare their productivity in terms of total maize per hectare; income from
maize production measured both in terms of accounting and economic profits per hectare.
Given the fact that FFS graduate farmers own larger farm sizes than those non-FFS
graduate farmers, profit margin diminishes as we look at their per hectare contributions although
they were still significant at 10 percent. FFS graduate farmers had modest difference from nonFFS graduate farmers in terms of total cost per hectare and cash cost per hectare they incurred.
There was no as such apparent difference between the two farmer groups in terms of fertilizer use
per hectare, total labor application per hectare and total cost per hectare.
In general, fertilizer application per hectare of the smallholder farmers in the study areas is
low compared to both the African and world standards. However, we it was revealed that the basic
factor underlying poor technology adoption in the study areas is neither lack of awareness as
government claims nor lack of desire for success by the smallholder farmers. The major constraints
identified as limiting technology adoption by the smallholder farmers are the escalating price of
the technology themselves, lack of credit arrangement for such input purchase, inconsistent supply
of the technologies, poor quality of the technologies supplied by the unions and their cooperative
as well as fear of risks associated with adopting such technologies in the face of rapidly changing
environmental factors owing to global warming. These findings suggest the need to create and
sustain a number of institutions whose functions are the base for the desired agricultural
transformation in the Ethiopian context.

Performance Indicators by Farmer Groups “Before and After”
Table 3 presents comparisons of various input and output performance indicators between
the two farmer groups before and after the FFS program intervention. A statistical comparison in
the table 3 reveals some seemingly ‘illogical’ and surprising results. The increase in productivity
achieved by the non-FFS graduate farmers is found to be almost three times the increase in the
productivity of FFS graduate farmers between the two time periods. Although the FFS graduates
had statistically higher maize productivity before the training year [t=1.798], the difference
gradually diminished two years after the training.
Vertical comparison reveals that FFS graduate farmers have maintained statistically
significant labour yield both before and after the program implementation. However, comparison
in terms of change in labour productivity between the two time periods reveals that the difference
actually disappeared. Similarly, although FFS graduate farmers had statistically significant higher
difference in terms of technical efficiency before the program implementation, this difference
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rapidly diminished two years after the program implementation. As the result, we couldn’t find
any statistical difference in terms of technical efficiency change between the two farmers groups
over time periods.
Table 3
Performance indicators before and after FFS by farmer groups
Measurement year
2010= y0
2012 = y2
Difference = y2-y0
Parameters
mean
Std. Err
mean
Std. Err
mean
Std. Err
Maize yield/ha in
kg:
Non FFS Graduates 3737.402 121.88 4042.747 132.91 305.3447
121.86
FFS graduates
4048.147 122.48 4138.464
124.7
90.31728
89.6580
t-test
-1.798*
-0.524ns
1.41 ns
Labor yield(kg/man-day):
Non FFS Graduates
68.609
2.678
68.507
2.496
-0.103
2.319
FFS graduates
80.050
3.344
82.533
3.696
2.483
2.597
t-test
-2.68***
-3.1698***
-0.744ns
Technical
efficiency:
Non FFS Graduates
FFS graduates
t-test
Non cash cost/ha:
Non FFS Graduates
FFS graduates
t-test
Family labor/ha:
Non FFS Graduates
FFS graduates
t-test
Act income/ha:
Non FFS Graduates
FFS graduates

6870.686

t-test

0.57
0.62
-2.13**

0.02
0.02

0.58
0.61
-1.60*

0.02
0.02

1492.863
1448.457
0.619 ns

51.145
50.288

2596.646
2373.331
1.718*

98.682
83.831

48.329
46.635
0.681 ns

1.778
1.735

51.433
45.964
2.165**

1.902
1.648

3.104
-0.670

6241.53

264.06
9
268.86
8

11149.0

484.68

4907.50

404.26

11506.87

441.374

4636.184

315.116

4748.664

FFS graduates

5422.229

1103.783
71.870
924.874
48.772
2.042**

-0.544 ns

1.6693*

Econ income/ha:
Non FFS Graduates

0.01
.0142
-0.01
.0088
0.7571 ns

248.55
2
255.85
6

1.3096
.901422
2.354**

0.526 ns

8552.382

439.456

9133.544

410.606

3803.718
3711.315

372.785
303.522

t-test
-1.889*
-0.964 ns
0.191 ns
Note. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * Significant at 10%, ns non-significant
difference. Source: Own calculation from survey data
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In addition, our analysis shows that the FFS graduate farmers have used more fertilizer per
hectare and hence incurred more cash cost of production than those of non-FFS graduate farmers
while the later uses significantly [ t=2.0419] higher non cash cost of production such as family
labor, oxen and compost. Furthermore, the higher labour productivity difference in the face of
lower productivity difference for the FFS graduate farmers also suggests less labour employment
per hectare while the non-FFS graduate farmers increased the use of such input each year. Thus,
more technological adoption may not automatically result in productivity enhancement without
proper agronomic practices such as timely field preparation, timely planting, and timely
applications of agronomic chemicals.
Eventually, after two years of FFS training, crop income of the non-FFS graduate farmers
both in terms of accounting and economic profits has matched with that of the FFS graduated
farmers, although the later farmer group had significantly higher net crop income during the
baseline year of 2010. With this understanding, more sophisticated assessment of FFS on technical
efficiency of the farmers is presented in the next sections.
Assessment of Farmer Field School Impact Using PSM
In this section, we have employed PSM which doesn’t require distributional assumptions
to identify casual effects of the program (Kassie, Shiferaw and Murich, 2010). Although there are
a number of matching methods to match the FFS program participant sampled households with
the sampled non-FFS program households, in this study, we have used the nearest neighbor
matching (attnd), radius matching with two different calipers (attr 0.01 and attr 0.005) and kernel
matching (attk) each with two different commands: Psmatch2i and Pscoreii.
Asymptotically, all the four matching methods with two different command types are
supposed to lead to the same conclusion although the specific results may not be necessarily the
same. This is to mean that, if the FFS impact on any of the impact indicator is robust, findings
from most matching algorithms must lead to the same conclusion. Thus, such use of different
matching algorithms with two different command types is used as effective robustness check of
the estimated program impact, which is again, to be confirmed by the impact assessment using
DID in the subsequent section.
Estimation of the Propensity Scores
In estimating propensity score matching, the samples of program participants and nonparticipants were pooled, and then participation equation was estimated on all the observed
covariates X in the data that are likely to determine participation (World Bank, 2010). In estimating
the propensity sores, we first tried by fitting all data collected on the covariates into logit model
and gradually reduced the number of the covariates until we get the desired good match. Finally,
we have maintained those influential covariates determining the program participation. The
covariates included comprises of different forms of assets such as natural resource (land), financial
resource (access to credit), physical asset (infrastructure such as access to roads), social capital
(social networks), and human forms of capital (experience and education levels). Table 4 presents
the logit estimates of the FFS program participation equation.
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Table 4
Estimation of Propensity Score: Dependent variable HH participation in FFS
Number of obs =445
Wald chi2(20)=74.71
Prob > chi2= 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1549

Log pseudolikelihood = -190.04376
Variables

Coef.

Robust
St.Err.

z

P>|z|

[95%Conf.interval]

0.681

-.0626648

.0409546

0.811

-.6748586

.862459

Household head age

-.0108551

.026434

Household head sex
(1 male)
Household education
Household literacy
(1 yes)
Farming Experience
None farm income
(Birr)
Family Size

.0938002

.3921801

0.41
0.24

.0955047
1.139841

.0697257
.3750863

1.37
3.04

0.171
0.002

-.0411551
.4046854

.2321646
1.874997

.0138987
.0000365

.025946
.0000438

0.54
0.83

0.592
0.404

-.0369545
-.0000492

.064752
.0001223

-.0275738

.0631437

0.662

-.1513332

.0961857

-.0086456

.1285851

0.946

-.2606677

.2433766

-.0675697

.0393377

0.086

-.1446702

.0095308

.6056229

.2973728

0.44
0.07
1.72
2.04

0.042

.0227828

1.188463

.2386495
7.35e-06

.286769
.0000104

0.83
0.71

0.405
0.479

-.3234074
-.000013

.8007064
.0000277

.0971948

.3450007

0.28

0.778

-.5789941

.7733838

.453459

.3240438

1.40

0.162

-.1816549

1.088573

.017125

.0101495

1.69

0.092

-.0027674

.0370178

-.524440

.3757721

0.163

-1.260941

.2120588

.042385

.1042641

1.40
0.41

0.684

-.1619685

.2467394

.198122
-2.9335

.1925527
.7304996

1.03
4.02

0.304
0.000

-.1792743
-4.365277

.5755184
-1.501771

Distance from
techno centre
Distance from
district town
Has of a pair of
oxen
Has mobile phone
Estimated asset
value
Has land use
certificate
Head is member of
coop.
Number of DA
visit/year
Head has access to
credit
Household land size
(ha)
Maize farm land (ha)
Constant

Note. Source: Own calculation from survey data of June to July 2010
It shows that some covariates are statistically significantly associated with FFS program
participation. Educational level of the household head measured in terms of years of schooling,
household head literacy measured as ability to read and write, possession of household assets such
as one or more pair of farming oxen, mobile phone, total asset values, social network
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participation, such as participation in farmers’ cooperative, number of development agents contact
with the household per year, possession of land use certificate, and possession of larger farm size
were positively associated with FFS program participation. In the contrary, such covariates as age
of the household head, family size, distance from centers where farm technologies were distributed
and distance from the district town were negatively associated with the FFS program participation.
The younger the household head, the more likely she/he is educated and hence the more chance of
selection into the training program was. These findings are consistent with the stated criteria of
selecting household heads for FFS program participation as it was designed to train few affluent
households, who are supposed to be easily trained and train others. These findings also indicate
that participation in the FFS program was mainly influenced by observable covariates and hence
hidden covariates played very little role which, in turn, implies that the results of program
assessment using PSM approach were unbiased and consistent.
The main purpose of the propensity score estimation was to balance the observed
distributions of covariates across two farmer groups. We need to ascertain that there is sufficient
common support region for the two groups of farmers. The differences in the covariates in the
matched two groups have been eliminated. These two issues are the necessary preconditions for
the reliability of the subsequent estimations of the program impacts. The predicted propensity
scores range from 0.0365417 to 0.8797614 with mean value of 0.3310722 for the FFS graduates
farmers, while it ranges from 0.0185319 to 0.9011666 with mean value of 0.1716005 for those
non-FFS graduate farmers. Accordingly, the common support region was satisfied in the range of
0.03654173 to 0.8797614 with only 17 losses of observations (one from those FFS graduates and
16 from those non-FFS graduates farmers). Figure 1 below shows the regions of common support
for the two groups of farmers.

0

.2

.4
.6
Propensity Score

Untreated: Off support
Treated

.8

1

Untreated: On support

Figure 1. Propensity score distributions and common support for the propensity score estimation.
Source: own calculation from survey data
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Note that “untreated off support” indicates those observations in the non-FFS graduates
that do not have suitable comparison from the FFS graduates and hence excluded from the analysis
while “untreated on support” indicates those observations in the non-FFS graduate that do have
suitable comparison from the FFS graduates and used in the analysis. Thus, the graph clearly
reveals that there is considerable overlap in the predicted propensity scores of the two groups. To
verify whether the differences in the covariates in the matched two groups have been eliminated,
we need to make test of covariate balancing. Accordingly, Table 5 presents results from covariate
balancing test before and after matching. Mean standardized bias between the two groups after
matching has been significantly reduced for all matching algorithms. This suggests that there is no
systematic difference between the two groups after matching. The standardized mean difference
which was around 26 percent for all covariates used in the propensity score before matching is
significantly reduced to about five to seven percent after matchingiii, which has substantially
reduced total bias between 73.3 to 82.2 percent depending on which matching algorithm is used.
Table 5
Quality of Matching before and after matching
Before Matching
After Matching
Algorithms
Pseudo LR X2
Mean Pseudo
LR X2 Mean Total bias
2
2
R
(P-value)
std
R
(P-value)
std
reduction
Bias
Bias
(%)
NNM
0.179
110.28
26.2
0.042
23.82
5.4
79.4
(p=0.000)
(p=0.250)
RBM (0.01)
0.179
110.28
26.2
0.037
19.58
7
73.3
(p=0.000)
(p=0.484)
RBM(0.005) 0.179
110.28
26.2
0.029
12.08
5.3
79.8
(p=0.000)
(p=0.913)
KBM
0.179
110.28
26.2
0.01
5.93
4.6
82.4
(p=0.000)
(p=0.999)
Note. NNM
= Nearest Neighbor Matching with replacements
RBM (0.01) = Radius Based Matching with replacement using caliper of 0.01
RBM (0.005) = Radius Based Matching with replacement using caliper of 0.005
KBM
= Kernel Based Matching
Source: own calculation from the survey data
In addition, comparisons of the pseudo R2 and p-values of likelihood ratio test of the joint
insignificance of all regressors obtained from the logit estimations before and after matching
(Sianesi, 2004) shows that the pseudo R2 has substantially reduced from about 18 percent before
matching to about one percent in the case of kernel matching and to four percent with nearest
neighbor matching. The joint significance of covariates was rejected since the p-values of
likelihood ratio test are insignificant in all matching cases. In summary, the high total bias
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reduction, lower pseudo R2, low mean standardized bias and insignificant p-values of the
likelihood ratio test after matching suggests that the propensity score equation specification is very
much successful in terms of balancing the distributions of covariates between the two groups of
farmers.
Table 6
Estimates of stochastic frontier production function for maize farmers (panel data)
Input variables
Constant
Maize land (hectare)
labour used (man-days)
Oxen labour (oxen days)
DAP applied (kg)
Urea applied (kg)
Seed used (kg)
compost used (qt)
Year of observation
Inefficiency variables:
Constant
Age of HH head
Gender of HH head
Marital status of HH head
HH head can read and write
Educational level of the HH head
Farming experience of HH head in years
HH family size (number)
Average annual non farm income
HH head has radio
HH has land use certificate
HH land [hectare]
Distance from technology center[hrs]
Average DA contacts
Plough frequency
Guto Gida District
Gida Ayana District
Time (year)
Sigma-square (δ2 = δu2+δv2)
Gamma (γ = δu2/δ2)
eta (  )
ln (Likelihood) LR test
Mean Technical Efficiency
Note. Source: own calculation from the survey data

coefficient
6.8057
1.1688
0.1008
0.0765
0.1106
-0.0270
0.0511
0.0311
0.0190

St. .error
0.0972
0.0558
0.0172
0.0204
0.1357
0.1406
0.0310
0.0114
0.0299

t-ratio
70.0289
20.9301
5.8682
3.7537
0.8150
-0.1924
1.6468
2.7150
0.6352

9.7654
0.0557
-1.1409
-0.6680
-0.0168
0.0503
0.0002
-0.0777
0.0001
-0.6236
-0.3815
-0.4320
0.9483
-0.0380
-2.7585
-14.5711
-7.4981
0.0865
4.4100
0.9911
-0.0622
-1060.14
0.59

1.2695
0.0162
0.5093
0.2593
0.2527
0.0404
0.0160
0.0321
0.0000
0.1492
0.2086
0.0559
0.1028
0.0091
0.1878
0.7942
0.5075
0.0954
0.3866
0.0016
0.0251

7.6921
3.4400
-2.2401
-2.5766
-0.0666
1.2457
0.0138
-2.4190
3.7598
-4.1795
-1.8286
-7.7333
9.2283
-4.1556
-14.6874
-18.3459
-14.7759
0.9071
11.4071
611.9111
-2.4812
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Estimation of Farmers’ Technical Efficiency
Following Battese and Coelli (1995) model, the mean of farm-specific technical
inefficiency Ui, was estimated using equation 5 above. Table 6 presents the estimates of stochastic
frontier production function for maize farmers using pooled data of three years both for FFS
graduate and non-FFS graduate farmers. Before proceeding to the analysis of impact of FFS on
the technical on the technical efficiency of the farmers, it was necessary to assess the presence of
inefficiency in the production data for the sampled households. Given the specifications of the
stochastic frontier production function defined by equation (5), the null hypothesis that technical
inefficiency is not present in the model is expressed by H o :   0 , where  the variance ratio is
explaining the total variation in output from the frontier level of output attributed to technical
efficiencies and defined by  

u2
. The parameter  must lie between 0 and 1; the closer
v2  u2

the value of  to zero, indicates that the inefficiency effects are insignificant and vice versa.
Accordingly, generalized likelihood-ratio tests of null hypotheses of the estimated
parameters are presented in Table 7 below.
Table 7
Likelihood-ratio tests of hypotheses for parameters of the stochastic frontier production function
Null Hypothesis

Log likelihood

*

Given Model
1060.14
 0
1493.86
867.43
     0
1337.10
553.92
   0
1337.10
553.92
 0
1336.96
553.63
 0
1276.27
432.26
Note. Source: own calculation from survey data

Critical
value

Decision

6.63
11.34
9.21
6.63
6.63

Reject the null hypothesis
Reject the null hypothesis
Reject the null hypothesis
Reject the null hypothesis
Reject the null hypothesis

The first null hypothesis tested states that technical inefficiency is not present in the model,

H o :  0 was strongly rejected. Similarly, the null hypotheses states that technical inefficiency
effects are time invariant and that they have half normal distribution defined by H0:  = 0 and
H0:  = 0 were also strongly rejected. As the estimated parameter  was found to be significantly
negative, which was -0.0622 at [t=2.5], it means that the technical efficiency of the sampled
farmers decreases over time. It was also proved that the inefficiency effects in the stochastic
frontier are clearly stochastic and are not unrelated to the household and farm specific variables
and year of observation included in the model. The fact that the null hypothesis stating that
parameter  is zero was rejected implies that truncated-normal distributional assumption of one
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sided error term is more appropriate for the farmers in the study area than half-normal
distributional assumption.
The signs of the coefficients of the stochastic frontier are as expected, with the exception
of the negative estimate of the urea applied. The estimated elasticities of mean output with respect
to land, human labour, and oxen labor are 1.1688, 0.1008, and 0.0765 respectively. This means
that for a 10 percent increase in area cultivated to maize, maize output will increase by 11.68
percent. This shows the importance of farm size for maize production. This could be related to
achievement of economies of scale. This clearly indicates the rejection of the strongly held view
of the Ethiopian government who assumes the smallholder farmers as more efficient than the larger
farm size operators. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in the amount of human labour increases
maize output by 1.01 percent, again indicating the significance of human labor for routine maize
farm management. A 10 percent increase in oxen labour increases maize output by about 0.8
percent. The estimated elasticity for compost is 0.0311 implying that a 10 percent increase in its
application increase maize output by 0.31 percent and this result is statistically significant at 1
percent.
As the estimated coefficients in the inefficiency model are more relevant for this study. It
is reasonable to discuss these results in a more detail. As expected, the age coefficient is positive,
which indicates that the older farmers are more inefficient than the younger ones. This could be
because the elders lack the required capacity to deal with routine agricultural work and or because
they lack literacy. The negative estimate for gender implies that the males are more efficient than
females. This is actually true in the reality of the study areas as females are usually preoccupied
with in-house activities including child caring while the agricultural activities which demand more
labour are customarily considered as the responsibility of males. Similarly the negative sign for
literacy implies that farmers who can read and write tend to be more efficient. The coefficient of
family size is negative implying the importance of labour for maize production. Those farmers
who have more non-farm income tend to be more inefficient and this is statistically significant
even at 1 percent. Other variables such as having a radio, land use certification, and size of land
owned, have negative signs. This shows that the individuals who have radio acess may acquire
updated information and hence tend to be more efficient. Also, having a land use certificate will
increase their tenure security and hence make the farmers more efficienct. The negative sign for
land size is consistent with the importance of larger farm land for achievement of scale of
economies. Plough frequency has the expected large negative signs with statistical significance
showing that if maize land is ploughed many times before planting, the more the efficient the
farmer will be. Dummy variables for the districts show negative sign implying that sampled
farmers in Guto Gida and Gida Ayana are more efficient than farmers in the Boneya Boshe district.
The positive coefficient for year variable in the inefficiency model although statistically
insignificant, suggests that the inefficiencies of the maize farmers tended to increase throughout
the year. This is also confirmed by the decreasing mean technical efficiency of the farmers which
was 0.60 during the year before the FFS training and reduced to 0.59 during the subsequent two
years after the training. The estimate for the variance parameter, y, is 0.9911 which is close to one,
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indicating that the inefficiency effects are likely to be highly significant in the analysis of the value
of output of the farmers. Furthermore, the estimates for parameters of the time varying
inefficiencies model indicate that the technical inefficiency effects tend to increase over time since
the parameter η is estimated to be negative (–0.0622) which is statistically significant at 5 percent.
Impact Estimation Using PSM
Our main interest in this section is to see if the FFS training program has brought any
desirable change in the technical efficiency of the FFS graduate farmers as compared to non- FFS
graduates. For this, the estimated technical efficiency for each farmer in the sample from the
equation 5 was used as dependent variable in the models specified by equation 13 above so as to
examine the technical efficiency difference between the two farmer groups. Accordingly,
comparison of technical efficiency across farmers groups is presented by Table 8.
Table 8
Comparison of technical efficiency across farmer groups
Command

Algorithms

FFS Graduate
Non FFS
(N)
(N)
Attnd
217
228
attr 0.01
202
228
Psmatch2
attr 0.005
177
228
Attk
217
228
Attnd
217
94
attr 0.01
191
212
Pscore
attr 0.005
174
199
Attk
217
212
Note. Source: own calculation from survey data

ATT

Std.Err

-0.0178
-0.0011
0.0028
0.0094
0.027
0.022
0.025
0.023

0.0336
0.0310
0.0320
0.0285
0.038
0.024
0.025
0.03

t
-0.53000
-0.04000
0.09000
0.33000
0.72900
0.90000
0.98000
0.77300

The result shows that the estimated coefficients are very small and inconsistent among
different matching algorithms. Since all are statistically insignificant, this implys that the FFS
graduate farmers do not seem different from other farmers in terms of their technical efficiency.
The result is also consistent with the implications of descriptive statistics explained above.

Impact Estimation using DID
In this section, household technical efficiency index estimated by equation 5 was used as
dependent variable in the impact estimation function specified by equation 15 above. In addition
to the participation dummy of FFS , various household and village characteristics were also
included as explanatory variables. However, as most household and village characteristics were
almost stable over the three periods, most of them were eliminated by differencing operation. As
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there could be significant differences of performance among farmers in different districts, it is
meaningful to include two district dummies Guto Gida and Boneya Boshe to control for the district
specific unobserved factors, while Gida Ayana was made implicit in this case.
For heteroscedasticity may cause problem to the “difference in difference” models
(Wooldridge, 2002; Leifeng, 2010; World Bank, 2010), we have tested for the existence of such
problems. We have observed that Breusch-Pagan Tests detected existence of significant
heteroscedasticity for estimated function. Therefore, we have reported the robust standard errors
as correction for heteroscedasticity problem. However, there was only one period left after
differencing, and there was no need of testing for serial correlation in the model.
Consistent with the technical efficiency estimates reported above, all variables included in
the estimates of technical efficiency growth rate are found with expected signs.
Table 9
Estimated impact on FFS graduate technical efficiency using DID
Dependent variable: Technical efficiency
N=446
F= 7.1700
R2= 0.5400
Variables
Coef.
St. Err
t
P>|t|
Constant
-0.0390
0.0093
-4.2000 0.0000
FFS Graduates
-0.0257
0.0096
-2.6700 0.0080
Plough frequency
0.0435
0.0187
2.3300 0.0200
Fertilizer used
0.0000
0.0001
-0.0700 0.9470
Maize farm
0.0064
0.0097
0.6600 0.5080
Family labor
0.0008
0.0002
3.5000 0.0000
Hired labour
-0.0001
0.0003
-0.4500 0.6540
Herbicide
-0.0024
0.0051
-0.4800 0.6310
Tractor use
0.0000
0.0000
0.1900 0.8480
Compost
0.0008
0.0009
0.9200 0.3570
DA visits
-0.0006
0.0007
-0.8700 0.3870
Guto Gida
0.0463
0.0126
3.6600 0.0000
Boneya Boshe
0.0862
0.0117
7.4000 0.0000
Note.Source: own calculation from the survey data

F = 0.0000
95% Conf. Interval
-0.0572
-0.0208
-0.0445
-0.0068
0.0069
0.0801
-0.0002
0.0002
-0.0126
0.0254
0.0004
0.0013
-0.0008
0.0005
-0.0124
0.0075
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0009
0.0026
-0.0021
0.0008
0.0214
0.0711
0.0633
0.1091

Consistent with the descriptive analysis discussed above, FFS graduate farmers are
identified with statistically significant lower technical efficiency growth rate. The model estimate
shows that participation in the FFS training program has reduced their technical efficiency growth
rate by about 0.3 percent and this difference is statistically significant at 1 percent. The Farmers
have reported that shortage of time to deal with their routine agricultural practices become the
major hindrance for their production and productivity enhancement. They have stated that they are
overloaded by the frequency of meetings and short term trainings of various types, rural road
construction, and natural resource conservation practices which usually coincide with their farm
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field preparation seasons tend to make farmers’ less efficient than before the FFS training program.
The farmers have actually reported that their efficiency declines over time, not because of lack of
the required technical skills, but mainly because of lack of time and financial resources to
undertake the required agricultural practices at right time. Furthermore, the model farmers have
bitterly expressed their concern over the natural resources conservation and rural road construction
practices that they are required to do for a minimum of 30 days each year. Such practices not only
consume their agricultural time but also severely curtail their efficiency as they are more frequently
injured while doing such heavy tasks as digging holes, rolling of rocks and carrying of heavy
woods.
Other variables such as plough frequency, application of family labor and dummy variable
representing the districts have all expected and statistically significant coefficients. The sign of the
estimated coefficient for family labor has statistically significant positive value implying the
importance of such labor for efficiency gain while the coefficient for the hired labour is negative.
Such finding is also consistent with microeconomic theory which states that in the absence of strict
supervision and monitoring, hired laborers fail to increase efficiency owing to their morale hazard
problem. Dummy variables for Guto Gida and Boneya Boshe districts have large, positive and
statistically significant coefficients implying significant differences in the technical efficiency
growth rate among farmers living in different districts. The significantly positive coefficient for
Guto Gida and Boneya Boshe districts imply that, on an average, farmers in both districts have
higher technical efficiency growth rate than farmers in the Gida Ayana district.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Conclusions
Our analysis shows that the training program was implemented in the study areas without
thorough understanding of the principles of FFS approach and the context within which it is
expected to bring the desired impacts. Specifically, the establishment of the farmers’ networks in
the form of a top-down approach are factors negatively affecting both the quality of training and
its diffusion effects and hence reducing the program impacts. Our result shows that the farmers’
networks are not organized in the way the farmers can take steps for dealing with challenges and
obstacles facing them through collective action.
As the FFS graduate farmers allocate most of their time for numerous mandatory meetings,
trainings, community mobilization, and their heavy involvement in political canvassing, they
tended to use more paid labour than maximizing their own labour for the routine agricultural
practices. In addition, most FFS graduate farmers substituted applications of herbicide chemicals
in lieu of manual weeding and their cash cost of maize production increased over time, while their
technical efficiency declines owing to lack of time to monitor those paid laborers.
The major constraints identified are : limited technology adoption by the smallholder
farmers, escalating price of the technology themselves, lack of credit arrangement for such input
purchase, inconsistent supply of the technologies, poor quality of the technologies supplied by the
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unions and their cooperative, and fear of risks associated with adopting such technologies in the
face of rapidly changing environmental factors owing to global warming.
In the end, we have employed a number of sophisticated econometric models appropriate
for impact evaluation design. There are words of caution with regard to our conclusions. Firstly,
given the fact that FFS training program was the national agenda operating in all regions of the
country all at the same time, selection of representative districts and households were a real
challenge given the very limited research funding and time available. As a result, the data for this
study were collected only from three purposively selected maize producing districts and from each
district only one Kebele from where households were randomly selected. Thus, this approach has
enabled us to positively contribute to impact assessment literature and agricultural policy makers,
but it might have come at some expense of representativeness. Secondly, the chosen locations are
representative for maize producers in the region, we are not sure how well those locations represent
the average conditions under which the FFS training program was implemented in the country and
its impacts on other agricultural crops. Thirdly, it is true that the lessons learned from FFS program
would be forgotten if not used to practice shortly, by assessing program impact just two years after
the program intervention, we may be capturing the only medium term impacts that may or may
not last over time. In essence, the estimated impact shows impacts after two years of program
implementation, and does not show any possible dynamisms of the impact in the long run. Finally,
this study has only considered the impact on the technical efficiency of maize producer farmers,
no claim is made with regard to program impacts on other aspects such as general socio-economic
development, environmental conservations, health, and political sustainability that the program
might have impacted.
Policy Recommendations
The first policy recommendation is to contextualize the FFS training curriculum and its
timing of implementation to the specific situations of rural producers. It is important to avoid
blanket technology recommendation using FFS approach as the use and success rate of a
technology is usually location specific. The FFS training program should target at farmers’
identified problems and the farmers should decide on the special topics on which they need
discovery learning rather than the current top-down approach of FFS curriculum design. In
essence, FFS training program needs to be “people centered” in which case the farmers will freely
and autonomously participate in problem identification and its prioritization, curriculum design,
setting criteria for participant selection, and forming farmers’ networks with their own free choice.
On the other hand, the role of government has to be limited to assisting the farmers in the form of
assigning technically competent FFS facilitators who are conversant with the specific location
where the program is implemented; the supply of adequate material and logistic supports needed
for the training; and making uninterrupted follow up with the view to create incentives for farmers
to continue sharing experiences of technical changes even after the program is closed.
Our second recommendation to the policy makers is to clearly separate activities required
for agricultural transformation from activities required for political canvassing. Although the
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government has claimed “to bring agricultural transformation” as the driving objective for scaling
up of FFS training program as the national agenda, in practice, however, both the model farmers’
selection criteria into the program, as well as, their role in society after graduation from the
program are found to be popularizing the political doctrines of the ruling party rather than
catalyzing agricultural transformation of the country. It is really a temptation to think that the one
who is a model in agricultural activities can be the best in politics too. Thus, it is really important
for the government not to use both FFS training program and model farmers for political purposes
for which these two are not necessarily the best instruments.
For the third policy recommendation, we suggest that the government create and sustain a
number of more responsive rural institutions and the related institutional frameworks for the
desired agricultural transformation, which include:
i. Government should allow participation of private agricultural technology input suppliers,
whose success will depend on providing inputs to the producers when and where needed
and hence could be more responsive to shift in weather, cropping patterns and new
technology supplies on competitive base than unions and their cooperatives. Our study
showed that government and its parastatals such as the unions and cooperatives are almost
never in the right place, at the right time, with the right product in the allocations of
industrial products and seeds to the rural producers. Given their susceptibility to predatory
behaviors such as corruption, rent‐seeking, abuse of public resources, and a basic lack of
accountability. These parastatals have never been successful in addressing the smallholder
farmers’ real interests. Thus, government ought to reduce excessive reliance on the unions
and their cooperatives for the distributions of agricultural technologies to the smallholder
farmers.
ii. There should be credit arrangements for the poor farmers who are unable to finance the
required technologies.
iii. The government has to promote and design incentive structures for private firms to invest
in agricultural crop insurance scheme to build up the farmers’ trust in agricultural
technologies in the face of volatile output prices and rapidly changing environmental
impacts.
iv.
The government needs to consider implementation of a forward contract market. A forward
contract market refers to a futures market in which both the buyers and the sellers make an
agreement stipulating the amount to be exchanged and the exchange price and date of the
exchange before crop production while the actual physical exchange of outputs are made
at a later date after crop harvest. In this case, the government can use its parastatals such
as Ethiopian grain trade enterprise, Oromia Agricultural product market enterprise,
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) enterprise as well as unions and cooperatives to
inter into forward agreement with the smallholder farmers before their production decisions
so that the farmers can rationally make cost-benefit analysis of their productions. This
system will enable the smallholder farmers to make informed production and marketing
decisions simultaneously as they are supposed to know not only the input prices required
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for the production but also prices that their resulting output will bring in return as well.
Eventually, this system is expected to alleviate the fear of risk of product market failure
and hence encourage the smallholder farmers to use full technology packages so as to
maximize their income.
v. Finally, there should be farmers’ networks and organizations which are formed by the
smallholder farmers own freewill and which can promote their “human agency” rather than
the one being used as instruments for government political canvassing.
End Notes
i.

ii.

iii.

Psmatch2 is Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis and propensity score matching,
common support graphing, and Covariate imbalance testing developed by Leuven and
Sianesi (2003).
Pscore was developed by Becker and Ichino (2002) for the estimation of average treatment
effect based on propensity score. Although the estimated effects under both commands
may differ, both estimates are expected to lead to the same conclusion if the detected impact
estimation results are robust enough.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggested that a standardized mean difference greater than
20 percent should be considered too large and an indicator that the matching process has
failed.
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Deindustrialization in Africa
Richard Grabowski, Southern Illinois University
Abstract
Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has been characterized by deindustrialization.
Conventional economists argue that this is due to a bad environment for business decision
making. This paper provides a classical explanation for deindustrialization, the failure to
solve the food problem. That is, food staple prices have risen rapidly resulting in labor
becoming costly, although physically abundant. This has prevented the evolution of a
comparative advantage in labor intensive manufacturing. Structural change is an important
element of the process of economic development, especially in the early stages.
Productivity grows by shifting labor out of agriculture where productivity is low, and into
industry or manufacturing where labor productivity is high. However, there is not just a
comparative static productivity gain from structural change. It also seems that there is a
dynamic gain as well. Unconditional convergence in labor productivity does tend to occur
in manufacturing. That is, once a manufacturing sector is established in a less developed
region, labor productivity in that sector tends to converge to that found in that same sector
in developed countries. Thus, aggregate (economy wide) convergence generally fails to
occur in many low income countries because manufacturing remains much too small a
share in the overall economy. There is a dynamic gain in labor productivity that results
from successful structural change. Indeed the process described above seems to be a very
good description of the development process in East and Southeast Asia. These countries
managed to shift labor into labor intensive manufacturing and industry, a large part of
which was produced for export. This led to dramatic increases in the rate of growth of per
capita income as well as a dramatic reduction in overall levels of poverty.
Key words: Africa, staple food, structural change, manufacturing

Recently, economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has risen dramatically. Beginning in the
1990s a number of economic reforms occurred and there was rapid growth in the demand for raw
materials and resources resulting from rapid Chinese growth. These factors resulted in a significant
rise in growth rates of GDP per capita throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the
puzzling thing about this economic growth is that it has been accompanied by a lack of growth in
manufacturing and perhaps even a deindustrialization of the economy, with the share of
manufacturing and industry in GDP declining over time (reword SD). Compared to the East and
Southeast Asian experience this is a significant anomaly. It would seem to indicate that the recent
growth in the region is fragile in nature and not likely to persist. How does one explain this
anomaly? This is a very important question since China’s rapid economic development is opening
up significant opportunities.
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Specifically, unit labor costs are beginning to rise in China implying that China is shifting
out of the production of low end (labor intensive) manufactured and industrial goods and is moving
up the technological ladder by producing technologically more sophisticated (capital intensive,
physical as well as human capital) products. Thus opportunities exist for Sub-Saharan Africa to
shift into labor intensive, export oriented manufacturing and industry. However, the slow
development of industry and the deindustrialization process (reword SD) the region is undergoing
would seem to indicate that this opportunity is being or will be lost. Why is this process,
deindustrialization, occurring ? Conventional analysis has usually argued that this failure is the
result of governance issues, lack of investment in infrastructure and education, and a lack of
openness to trade and foreign investment. However, a number of countries in East and Southeast
Asia have managed to achieve rapid growth under similar circumstances. It will be argued, that
classical economics is more useful in trying to explain why Africa has de-industrialized and the
relevance of the classical model is related to a lack of institutional evolution.
Deindustrialization
What is deindustrialization ? Williamson and Clingingsmith (2005) have developed the
following explanation of the term : they assumed an economy in which two goods are produced
(agriculture and manufacturing) utilizing three inputs: labor, land, and capital. Labor is used to
produce both goods while capital is specific to manufacturing and land to agriculture. In this
context, absolute deindustrialization occurs when labor moves out of the manufacturing sector and
into the agricultural sector. Thus the absolute number of workers in manufacturing declines while
that in agriculture rises. In a many sector model absolute deindustrialization would generally
involve a fall in the number of workers in manufacturing. Relative deindustrialization occurs when
the share of total employment in manufacturing declines, while the share of agriculture expands.
In the context of a many sector model, relative deindustrialization involves a fall in the share of
manufacturing in total employment.
One can make a similar sort of analysis by focusing on the share of manufacturing in total
GDP. Thus absolute deindustrialization would be represented by a decline in real total
manufacturing. Alternatively, relative deindustrialization occurs when the share of manufacturing
in total GDP declines over time. Deindustrialization in terms of employment and production are
likely to be related. Those countries for which manufacturing output as a share of GDP is declining
are likely to be those countries for which manufacturing employment as a share of overall
employment is also likely to decline.
One could interpret the concept of deindustrialization in a broader sense. In this
interpretation manufacturing as a share of GDP or employment may not fall, instead it may remain
stable or even increase, but to a much lesser degree than another sector, in particular services. This
generally occurs while an economy attains a fairly high level of GDP per capita. However, this
can be quite problematic if it begins to occur at much lower levels of income. Why problematic?
Such a premature shift into services may limit future productivity growth. One can think of this as
deindustrialization in the sense that the more common pattern experienced by developing nations
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is that initially structural change involves a shift of production and employment into manufacturing
and industry and only later into services. Thus, the process by which the manufacturing stage is
skipped can also be thought of deindustrialization.
As growth has occurred over time in Sub-Saharan Africa, so has deindustrialization. Data
concerning this issue is difficult to find. deVries, Timmer, and deVries (2013) have developed a
useful data set for examining these issues. This data set covers eleven Sub-Saharan African nations
for the period 1960 to 2010. It includes data on gross value added at nominal, real, and international
prices as well as information on employment by sector of the economy. This data allows an
examination of the issues discussed above, especially those pertaining to structural change.
In Table One, data is presented on value added, employment, and relative labor
productivity by sector of the economy. The data for value added and employment represents each
sector’s proportion of the economy’s total value added and employment. With respect to relative
productivity levels, this represents the ratio of the sector’s labor productivity level to the total
economy’s productivity level. A 0.5 for agriculture implies that this sectors labor productivity was
half of that for the whole economy. Examining the data one can see that agriculture has certainly
followed the typical pattern in terms of structural change. Agriculture’s share in value added and
employment has significantly declined over time. However, labor productivity in agriculture has
lagged behind that of the rest of the economy.
Table 1
Value added, employment, and relative labor productivity by sector
Sectoral Shares
Sector

Value Added

Relative
Productivity Levels

Employment

1960

1975

1990

2010

1960

1975

1990

2010

1960

1975

1990

2010

Agriculture

37.6

29.2

24.9

22.4

72.7

66.0

61.6

49.8

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.4

Industry

24.3

30.0

32.6

27.8

9.3

13.1

14.3

13.4

4.4

3.7

3.5

2.6

Mining

8.1

6.2

11.2

8.9

1.7

1.5

1.5

0.9

15.7

22.4

23.3

19.5

Manufacturing

9.2

14.7

14.0

10.1

4.7

7.8

8.9

8.3

2.5

2.8

2.4

1.6

Other Industry

7.1

9.2

7.3

8.9

3.0

3.8

3.9

4.2

8.5

5.8

5.3

2.9

Services

38.1

40.7

42.6

49.8

18.0

20.9

24.1

36.8

2.7

2.5

2.4

1.6

Total
Economy

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0
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When focusing on the industrial sector several anomalies appear (word choice SD).
Looking at the industrial sector as a whole, the share of value added seems to have risen between
1960 and 1990. However, after that there is a decline. Examining the subcategories under industry
one can see that manufacturing actually begins to decline after 1975. In terms of employment,
employment shares in both industry and manufacturing rise until 1990 and then decline.
Examining relative productivity a similar story emerges. Overall productivity in industry is
significantly greater than that found in the overall economy, but this overall advantage begins to
decline as after 1975. Manufacturing follows a similar pattern.
Finally, the sector which has expanded most rapidly has been the service sector. It has
grown both in terms of value added and employment shares. Looking at relative labor productivity,
one can see that this sector is more productive than the economy as a whole, but not to the extent
of industry. Also relative productivity has fallen over time. Lastly, relative labor productivity in
services was certainly higher than that of agriculture throughout the time period.
So what conclusions can be drawn from this data? First, relative deindustrialization seems
to have occurred both in terms of employment and value added. Second, deindustrialization has
also seemed to occur in the sense that structural change seems to have skipped over industry with
the service sector taking up the unused capacity in terms of both production and employment. The
picture of structural change in Sub-Saharan Africa can be described in the following manner.
Agriculture has shrunk in terms of both production and employment. Much of this production and
employment has shifted into the service sector, not the industrial sector (nor manufacturing). The
shift in labor has been from a low productive sector, agriculture, to a higher productive sector,
services. However, the gain in productivity seems to have been much less than that which would
have occurred from a shift to industry. Even more importantly, productivity growth in services is
much lower than that in industry. We can describe this type of structural change as generating
static gains at the expense of dynamic losses (deVries, et al., 2013).
Table 2
Sectoral Composition Real GDP
Year
Primary
Industry
Services
1888
41.5
8.1
46.3
1900
34.6
11.3
47.5
1910
31.5
5.4
42.8
1920
24.7
19.0
43.2
1930
20.7
24.0
35.6
1938
15.9
32.4
32.3
Note. Adapted from: Teranishi (2005).

Construction
2.6
3.5
4.0
3.4
4.9
6.9

Infrastructure
1.5
3.1
6.3
9.7
14.6
12.3

This pattern is much different than that found in the successful cases in Asia, particularly
in East Asia. Japan represents the first non-Western nation to converge to developed country
standards of living. This process began before World War II and accelerated thereafter. The focus
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here will be on the prewar period and data on the sectoral composition of GDP in the prewar period
is presented in Table Two. As one can see, the share of primary production declines throughout
the period while that for industry rises. Employment trends followed trends in sectoral GDP as
well. Structural change involved a shift from agriculture to industry.
South Korea too has managed to converge towards developed countries’ living standards
with rapid growth beginning in the 1960s. Table Three provides some information concerning the
structural change process. As one can see, agriculture declined both as a share of GDP and
employment from 1962 to 1980, while the share of industry in these two categories rose
dramatically in tandem with the service sector. Thus economic development was accompanied by
a shift of labor out of agriculture and into industry and manufacturing.
Table 3
Structural Change - South Korea
1962

1970

1980

Agriculture
% of GDP
39.8 29.7 17.8
% of Employment
63.1 50.4 34.0
Industry
% of GDP
14.6 19.7 25.3
% of Employment
8.7 14.3 22.6
Services
% of GDP
45.6 50.6 56.8
% of Employment
28.2 35.2 43.4
__________________________________
Note. Adapted From: Looney (2012)

Finally, Taiwan has been able to converge to a standard of living similar to that found in
developed countries. Rapid growth began in the 1960s and it was also accompanied by dramatic
structural change with agriculture declining in importance both in terms of GDP and employment.
This was accompanied by growth in both industry and services as shares of GDP and employment.
These results are reflected in Tables Four and Five.
The contrast between the structural changes experienced by East Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa are quite stark. In East Asia, the shift out of agriculture was accompanied by the expansion
of industry and in most instances services too. Alternatively, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced
relative deindustrialization in terms of both GDP and employment. The rapid expansion of
manufacturing has failed to occur. It appears that industrialization has been skipped.
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Table 4
Structural Change in GDP -Taiwan
Year

Agriculture

Industry

Services

Total

1952

36.0

18.0

46.0

100

1956

31.9

22.4

46.0

100

1960

32.9

24.9

42.2

100

1964

28.3

28.9

42.8

100

1968

22.1

32.6

45.4

100

1972

14.2

40.3

45.5

100

1980

9.2

44.7

46.1

100

1988

6.1

46.2

47.7

100

Note. Adapted From: Mao and Schive (1995)

Table 5
Structural Change in Employment -Taiwan
Year

Agriculture

Industry

Services

Total

1952

56.1

16.9

27.0

100

1956

53.2

18.3

28.5

100

1960

50.2

20.5

29.3

100

1964

49.5

21.3

29.2

100

1968

40.8

25.4

33.8

100

1972

33.0

31.8

35.2

100

1980

19.5

42.4

38.1

100

1988

13.7

42.6

43.7

100

Note. Adapted From: Mao and Schive (1995)
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Why has Sub-Saharan Africa Failed to Develop a Comparative
Advantage in Industry (manufacturing)?
Explanations: Conventional and Classical
Conventional Perspective
Conventional perspectives on Sub-Saharan Africa’s failure to evolve a productive
industrial sector tend to focus on issues of policy and governance. With respect to policy, it is often
noted that after World War II and the successful move to independence, many of the new
governments pursued a state centered process of economic development that has come to be known
as import substitution industrialization (ISI). This approach to industrialization sought to protect
or subsidize industrial production. Many of these countries had comparative advantages in a
variety of primary types of goods, often based on minerals and other sorts of natural resources.
The ISI strategy involved policies that shifted resources out of sectors in which these countries
were relatively efficient and into sectors in which production was inefficient.
The policies utilized were quite varied. Tariffs and quotas were used to provide protection
to domestic manufacturing firms. Foreign exchange controls were imposed so as to allow the state
to control foreign exchange and direct it to sectors which were being promoted. In some instances,
state ownership and control of specific sectors was undertaken to allow the state to directly manage
resource allocation. Agriculture was often neglected in terms of investment since productivity
there tended to be quite low. In addition, the state often created parastatal institutions for the
marketing of important agricultural goods. This allowed the state to use monopsony power to push
down the relative prices of these agricultural goods. This effectively transferred resources to the
non-agricultural sector (Anderson and Masters, 2009).
The results of ISI have been viewed negatively. As was discussed in Table One, the share
of industry in GDP and employment did rise, but not dramatically. The protected sectors of the
economy remained largely inefficient. From a dynamic perspective this strategy seemed to fail.
International indebtedness rose dramatically among the nations of the region eventually resulting
in an economic collapse. Beginning in the 1990s many countries in the region underwent structural
adjustment programs under the direction of various international institutions. In this process tariffs
and quotas were reduced, exchange rates reformed and devalued, state ownership was reduced in
extent, and marketing boards dismantled. The extent of protection of industry and manufacturing
was dramatically reduced and the extent of discrimination against the agricultural sector was
reduced. This has, according to some, laid the foundation for the rapid economic growth
experienced by the region over the last fifteen years. Policy changes are seen to be the key in
integrating Africa with the international economy and promoting rapid growth (Sachs and Warner,
1997).
The failure of manufacturing/industry to rapidly grow even during the recent period of
rapid overall growth is often attributed to problems of governance or the bad business environment
that results from flawed governance. Problems involving governance are often manifested in
widespread corruption in government institutions. This results in misallocated investment, waste,
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and slower growth. Resources are utilized to the benefit of small groups of powerful political elites.
Authoritarian political structures dominate and there are few checks on the use of power.
Bad business environments are also the result of the lack of infrastructure in many Sub-Saharan
countries. The lack of infrastructure, including power generation and distribution, limits the spread
of modern manufacturing firms. In addition, the red tape and bureaucracy limits entrepreneurial
decision-making and inhibits investment in modern manufacturing firms. This results in
productivity enclaves, “islands of high productivity in a sea of smaller low productivity firms.”
(Gelb, et al., 2014).
The solution to the problems of corruption and the existence of a bad business environment
are thought by many to involve political reform. This reform would involve the expansion of
pluralism via the construction of democratic institutions and practices. In fact, better recent policies
and economic performance have been at least partly linked to significant political reform (Ndulu
and O’Connell, 1999).
The conventional or neoclassical perspective is undermined by the fact that most of the
economically successful countries of East and Southeast Asia were faced with similar initial
conditions. Governance issues and corruption in these countries, result in environments that limit
the development of manufacturing. Democracy and pluralism did not precede rapid growth and
the development of labor intensive manufacturing. In most cases, it was the exact opposite. South
Korea and Taiwan industrialized under authoritarian regimes as has China. Japan began its
industrialization process (prior to World War II) under a political regime which was authoritarian
in nature, even though there were some aspects of democratic institutions in existence.
Classical Perspective
A relatively modern version of classical analysis in development economics is represented
by the work of Lewis (1954). He developed a model composed of two sectors: traditional and
modern. The traditional sector was mainly distinguished by how production units make decisions.
He argued that output in this sector was shared in a manner such that each worker receives their
average product. Only labor and land are used in the production process and no capital is utilized
or accumulated (saving and investment are zero). Finally, no technological innovation occurs in
the staple food production.
The modern sector will be assumed to represent manufacturing. Profits are maximized with
wage being equal to the marginal product of labor. Capital and labor are utilized in the production
process with the former being accumulated via savings and investment. In the Model, technical
change does not occur. Within this scheme, economic growth can only arise via structural change.
The marginal product of labor in the traditional sector is assumed to be zero (surplus labor), while
manufacturing is positive. As capital is accumulated in the modern sector, labor shifts from the
sector where productivity is low to the sector where it is high (manufacturing) and growth occurs
with labor productivity rising (per capita income).
Difficulties arise when surplus labor is exhausted. When this occurs continued expansion
of manufacturing implies that food production declines and the relative price of food rises. Wages
in the manufacturing sector must rise in order to cover the increased cost of food. This will tend to
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reduce profits and slow or perhaps halt structural change (and thus growth) altogether. In addition,
the production technology in the modern sector is likely to become more capital intensive, further
slowing structural change.
There are several drawbacks to this analysis. First, as outlined above, the economy is closed
to the outside world. Results are likely to alter if one allows trade. Second, the concept of surplus
labor is controversial to say the least. Third, the growth process is structural in nature with no
allowance for technical change. Within this limited context though, a simple implication does
emerge. Labor may be physically abundant, but not economically cheap due to the rising cost of
food. In this situation, manufacturing may very well fail to develop because food becomes
increasingly expensive and what manufacturing that does develop is likely to be more capital
intensive and less labor intensive in nature.
One can easily eliminate the surplus labor assumption and assume labor is paid its marginal
product. Eswaran and Kotwal (2004) have constructed a dualistic model in which the expenditure
patterns of households are dependent on income. Specifically, at low income levels all income is
spent on food, however once income attains a specific threshold, an increasing share is spent on
manufacturing. As savings and capital accumulation occur in the modern sector, income rises and
households begin pending an increasing proportion of their income on manufactured goods.
However, whether this structural change process continues still depends on what happens to
productivity in the food sector. If productivity remains unchanged, then output in food production
will decline as labor moves into manufacturing. The rising price of food is likely then to stop the
expansion of the modern sector since the real wage in manufacturing will have to dramatically
rise. Rapid growth in agricultural productivity will keep food prices down and allow structural
transformation.
Given the dynamic characteristics of manufacturing, structural change from agriculture to
manufacturing is crucial to development. Rodrik (2013) has shown that unconditional productivity
convergence does tend to occur in manufacturing. That is, although the labor productivity of newly
established manufacturing firms is likely to be low by the international standards of developed
countries, the productivity of the sector quickly tends to converge to international standards of
productivity. The shift from agriculture to manufacturing in the development process creates static
gains. Labor moves from low to high productivity activities. But, dynamic gains in labor
productivity in manufacturing tend to grow rapidly. The key to this process involves raising
productivity in staple foods so as to allow structural change to occur.
Up to this point, the dualistic model under discussion is closed in nature. However, the
implications of low productivity in staple food production persist within the context of a semiopen economy. This idea was originally developed by Myint (1975). A semi-open economy is one
in which part of the domestic economy remains insulated from foreign trade while part of the
economy is fully open to trade. In this case, the food producing sector is presumed to be closed to
trade while manufacturing is open. It is, at this point, useful to presume that agriculture can be
divided into two sectors, a closed sector producing food and a commercial agricultural sector that
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produces an export product utilizing labor and land (a comparative advantage in this product
exists).
In this context economic growth can occur in a variety of ways. For example, an exogenous
increase in this demand for the commercial agricultural product (in terms of trade improvement)
would cause resources (labor) to shift out of staple food production and into export production.
However, it will also draw resources from the tradable modern manufacturing sector with imports
of manufacturing goods rising. However, if food productivity does not increase rapidly enough,
the comparative advantage of the commercial, export oriented agricultural sector will decline and
the comparative disadvantage of manufacturing will increase as wage increases occur as a result
of the rise in staple food prices. Structural change (into manufacturing) will be stymied,
deindustrialization will occur.
An alternative process of economic growth could occur if government policy is used to
subsidize the expansion of manufacturing (initially this sector is characterized by comparative
disadvantage). The resulting expansion of this sector will draw labor from both staple food
production and export production, but if agricultural productivity stagnates, then rising wages will
reduce the comparative advantage in the commercial export crop and eventually prevent the
structural transformation of the economy via a shift into manufacturing. Structural change is found
to be crucially dependent on growth in food productivity.
Does it make sense to think that the staple food producing sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa are closed
to trade? Gollin, et al. (2007) has argued that for many Sub-Saharan nations the staple food sector
is to all intents and purposes a closed sector. Data from the FAO indicates that most poor countries
meet their demand for food from domestic production. Thus Gollin, et al. (2007) concludes that
“it is reasonable to view most economies as closed from the perspective of trade in food”. This
conclusion seems to be even more relevant for the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the food
staples for these countries are not extensively traded. Delgado, et al. (2004) argues that the cost of
transporting and marketing staple foods isolates this type of production from international markets.
Even when staple foods are traded, the markets for these goods are often quite thin. That
is, of total production of a particular staple worldwide, the percent that is actually traded is quite
small. As a result, changes in purchases on the international market by relatively small food
importers can still have dramatic effects on the price of such staples. Thus the price of staple foods
cannot be assumed to be an exogenous variable. Instead, it must be stipulated to be endogenously
determined in any model purporting to explain structural change.
A number of hypotheses can be put forward based upon analysis within the content of the
semi-open economy developed in this section. The deindustrialization of Sub-Saharan Africa
should be associated with slow growth in food staple production. Rapid growth over the last decade
or so should have resulted in rapid increases in staple food prices. Finally, although Africa is
characterized as being incresingly labor abundant, one should expect to find that labor is not
relatively cheap in this region.
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Empirical Evidence
Whether successful transformation occurs as growth takes place depends on whether
productivity in food production rises and keeps pace with the growth of the modern manufacturing
sector. Data on food production per capita for Sub-Saharan Africa is presented in Table Six
indicating that food production per capita has generally stagnated. By the year 2009, agricultural
output had not risen by much compared to what it was in the early 1960s. Sub-Saharan Africa has
not experienced a “Green Revolution” as has much of East and Southeast Asia. This is likely due
to several factors. First, much of East and Southeast Asia relied upon rice as the main wage good.
Technical innovation that creates higher yielding seed varieties has the potential to have an impact
over a broad graphical area. It is true that seeds must be tailored to particular soil and climatic
conditions.
Table 6
Net food production per capita (Index)
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

Per Capita
100
103
104
103
102
99
104
103
104
105
106
102
98
103
101
99
95
95
93
93
93
91
88
86
90

Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Per Capita
91
89
92
93
93
98
94
95
95
93
100
97
99
100
103
104
105
107
104
105
107
104
107
107

However, research into high yielding rice varieties has the potential to generate very high
rates of return. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the situation is quite different. No single food crop serves
as the wage good. Instead, a variety of different crops serve this function depending on which
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region in Sub-Saharan Africa one focuses on. The net direct return to investment in research in
any particular staple food crop research in Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be much lower than that
for rice. This in itself will tend to reduce the incentive for private research firms to undertake
investment. Also, public authorities are likely to be reluctant to make investments in areas where
the direct return is so low.
Given the wages good function of these staple foods, the benefits to society of investment
in such research are likely to be immense. Without productivity growth in staple food production,
the growth of labor intensive manufacturing is likely to be quite limited. This represents a situation
in which the investment in such research is likely to be significantly below what is optimal from
society’s point of view and this implies a significant role for the state in terms of providing
resources for such agricultural research (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). The problem of actually
creating an institutional structure to carry out such research will likely be more complex than that
faced in parts of Asia.
Table 7
Consumer prices, food indices (2000 = 100)
Region
World
Africa
Eastern Africa
Middle Africa
Western Africa
Southern Africa
Northern Africa
Americas
Northern America
Central America
Caribbean
South America
Asia
Eastern Asia
Southern Asia
Southeastern Asia
Western Asia
Europe
Eastern Europe
Northern Europe
Southern Europe
Western Europe
Note. Source: FAO

Food Price Index
232.5
354.4
445.4
711.2
356.3
245.7
257.5
211.7
141.3
209.8
364.8
293.9
229.2
188.2
255.7
259.4
421.6
189.7
293.8
148.2
149.7
128.0

It has been assumed in this paper that food staples are not widely traded and the price of
food in the dualistic model is endogenously determined. If staple food was widely traded, then
wewould see similar movement in prices in the various regions of the world. Data on food prices
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for various regions of the world is presented in Table Seven. Consumer food price indices are
presented for various regions of the world utilizing 2000 as the base year. Data is presented for the
year 2013 for each region. As can be seen, from 2000 to 2013 food prices around the world have
increased, but the patterns vary dramatically from region to region. First, world food prices have
risen to 232.5, more than doubling. But the variation by region is large.
The lowest increase was registered by Western Europe where prices increased very little.
Alternatively, for Middle Africa, food prices increased by seven times from 2000-2014. Further
examination of the table reveals that increases in food prices were highest for Middle Africa,
Eastern Africa, Western Asia, the Caribbean, and Western Africa. Food prices followed
dramatically different trends in various regions of the world lending support to the notion that
limited trade in food implies food price endogeneity. Second, large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa
experienced very rapid increases in food prices.
Such rapid increases in the cost of food in large parts of Africa, in comparison with other
regions of the world would, in the dualistic theoretical framework discussed above lead to labor
being relatively costly (although it may be physically abundant). Some light can be shed on this
issue by looking at unit labor costs which measures the ratio of wages to value added in
manufacturing. Using data from the World Bank Enterprise surveys Ramachandran, et al. (2009)
calculate unit labor costs for much of Sub-Saharan Africa and compare it to that for China and
India. What they find is that except for Mali, all other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have unit
labor cost ratios which are higher than that for India and China.
The comparison with China is particularly enlightening. China has dominated the
production and export of labor intensive manufactured goods. Their ability to dominate the world
market for such products is based on their “cheap labor”, which in this case means low unit labor
costs. The inability of Sub-Saharan Africa to compete on a unit labor cost basis indicates that the
latter will have trouble making inroads in terms of producing and exporting labor intensive
manufactured goods. It is possible that wages in China are being driven up as a result of rapid
economic growth and that unit labor costs in China will rise above those in Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, it would seem that the country most likely to benefit from this would more likely be
India, rather than Sub-Saharan Africa.
If labor is relatively more expensive in Sub-Saharan Africa, then one should find that
manufacturing firms are more capital intensive there then they should be as firms seek to shift their
resource combinations. Gelb, et al. (2013), using data drawn from the World Bank Enterprise
Surveys are able to calculate capital per worker ratios for formal sector firms in Africa and compare
them with those in firms in other regions of the world. The results are presented in Table Eight.
The interesting thing to note is that in comparison with East and South Asia, many countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa have substantially higher capital to labor ratios. Thus these firms are not likely
to generate significant increases in employment as growth occurs.
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Table 8
Firm level capital to worker ratio (2005 $)
Region
Capital/Worker (Survey Medians)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola
2118
Ethiopia
999
Ghana
474
Kenya
9211
Mali
864
Mozambique
1906
Nigeria
627
Senegal
1621
South Africa
8804
Tanzania
3410
Uganda
2162
Zambia
4007
East Asia
Indonesia
665
Philippines
3196
Vietnam
2824
Europe/Central Asia
Russia
6130
Turkey
22090
Ukraine
4140
Latin America/Caribbean
Argentina
8867
Brazil
6579
Chile
7146
Columbia
4417
Mexico
4437
Uruguay
5836
South Asia
Bangladesh
624
India
1267
Note. Adapted From: Gelb, et al. (2013)

This section of the paper has shown a number of related things. First, food production has
barely kept up with population growth and that dramatic increases in food productivity have yet to
occur. Food prices in Sub-Saharan Africa have, over time, followed a different pattern when
compared to other regions of the world. Specifically, food prices have risen dramatically faster in
this region elative to much of the rest of the world. Unit labor costs in most Sub-Saharan African
countries are above those found in China and India. Even adjusting for the level of GDP per capita,
labor costs are higher in Sub-Saharan Africa. “Labor is relatively more costly in high-productivity
firms with relatively low levels of capital intensity, the most desirable kind of a firm in a poor
capital constrained country” (Gelb, et al., 2013, p.15). Finally, in many Sub-Saharan countries
production in formal sector firms is relatively capital intensive.
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Summary and Conclusions
It has been argued in this paper that Sub-Saharan Africa, while growing rapidly by
historical standards, is also experiencing deindustrialization. Structural change has not involved a
dramatic shift of labor from agriculture to manufacturing. Manufacturing has instead stagnated
and/or shrunk as a share of GDP and employment. This is important since manufacturing, once
established, experiences catch-up in terms of labor productivity and grows rapidly approaching
levels found in developed countries. Services, although having higher labor productivity in
agriculture, do not seem to be characterized by absolute convergence.
Conventional economics has argued that the inability of manufacturing to rapidly expand
is related to the poor business environment which exists in Sub-Saharan Africa. Efforts should be
made to reduce rules, regulations, and red tape which restrict manufacturing growth. In addition,
corruption also makes it very difficult to establish new firms. Efforts also need to be devoted to
expanding basic infrastructure.
While not denying that the above are possible important factors restricting the growth of
manufacturing, this paper, using a classical approach, focuses on a much more straight forward
explanation. Manufacturing firms (formal sector) in the region find that labor is relatively
expensive and as a result utilize more capital intensive technology and thus find it extremely
difficult to develop a comparative advantage in manufacturing. Labor is increasingly abundant in
the region due to population growth, but it is increasingly expensive due to the rapid rise in the
cost of food. In a semi-open economy the prices of food staples are endogenous. Rapid expansion
in modern manufacturing is restricted by the rising cost of food. Empirical evidence supporting
these propositions was presented for the region.
The key policy implication is very clear. Unless agricultural productivity can be rapidly
increased, stabilizing the price of food staples, labor will remain expensive even though it is
relatively abundant and modern, and labor intensive manufacturing growth will be limited. The
difficulty in raising agricultural productivity is not so much technical or scientific in nature.
Instead, the main difficulty is institutional in nature. The great diversity of staple food agriculture
in the region implies that the research and extension system necessary to create and adapt the
technology must be decentralized. However, funding such an institutional structure from within
the region will create significant problems. Research into particular crops will benefit specific
regions only. Regions dependent on a particular food staple are unlikely to support funding for
other food crops. Economies of scale from research are likely to be limited. Significant investment
at the regional level is likely to be required, most likely beyond the financial means of the region
involved. Creating the institutional structure necessary to generate the technical innovation in food
staple production will prove to be difficult. In the face of these institutional difficulties much of
the agricultural research that has been carried out in the past has focused on non-staple agricultural
commodities which have generally been exported. Research and development has been biased
against staple food production. Unless this bias is altered, it is highly unlikely that rapid growth in
manufacturing can occur.
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Examining Human Capital Capacity’s Influence on
Human Development and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa
Theodore Davis, University of Delaware
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine and expand our focus on human capital capacity
building as a foundation for poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. The data showed
significant differences in the human capital capacity building characteristics as measured
by demographic, education and gender equality characteristics. In analyzing select human
capital capacity building markers, the findings suggest that the educational indicators were
among the strongest in explaining the variation in human development in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The findings showed that gender inequality was a serious inhibitor of human
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, the Sub-Saharan nations with the lowest level
of poverty had some combination of a population with higher median years of school
completed, a higher literacy rate, a lower population growth rate, a larger percent of the
population that lived in an urban area, and it had a higher rate of students progressing to
secondary education. The findings of this paper lends support to the belief that poverty
reduction cannot be confined to enhancing and understanding capacity building as an
institutional level activity or only as an economic phenomenon. Finally, the findings lend
support to the adoption of an integrated policy approach that takes into consideration social
development as well as economic development as a means of poverty reduction in SubSaharan Africa. The social component of the strategy would emphasize the collective
human capital development of the population, while the economic component would
employ an inclusive growth strategy.
Key words: Human capital capacity building, poverty reduction, human development,
Sub-Saharan Africa

Despite its abundance of natural resources and the potential for economic growth and
development on the continent, the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to have the highest
levels of extreme poverty, the highest annual population growth rate, a life expectancy that is
among the lowest in the world, a very low youth literacy rate, high infant mortality rate, and the
highest prevalence of HIV for adults than any other region in the world (World Bank, April 2009).1
In July 2001, the African Union adopted a new “framework for action” called The New Partnership
for African Development (NEPAD). NEPAD was a mandate to develop an integrated socioeconomic development framework to address escalating poverty, to achieve sustainable growth,
to halt the marginalization of Africa, and to accelerate the empowerment of women. Supporters
of NEPAD embraced the call for an “African Renaissance” based on a long-term vision to address
poverty alleviation in all African counties, with Africans taking the lead in the creation and
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development of programs to address the social, political and economic development on the
continent (Venter and Neuland, 2005).
The aim of this paper was to examine capacity building as a catalyst for human
development and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. The objectives of this paper are: 1)
focus on capacity building as a group level socio-political phenomenon, thus based on the
collective human resources and skills of a community, a nation, a region, or a continent); 2) to
analyze select human capital capacity building markers that are necessary for achieving poverty
reduction priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa; 3) to examine the influence of select human capital
capacity building measures on the nation’s overall level of human development and thus poverty
reduction; and 4) to discuss the implications for the creation of a policy approaches that results in
sustainable human development and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Challenges of Human Development and Poverty Reduction
In 2000, world leaders came together at United Nations Headquarters and adopted the
United Nations Millennium Declaration in which the countries of the world formed a global
partnership to reduce extreme poverty by 2015. The declaration set as part of its goals cutting in
half the proportion of people whose income was less than a dollar a day and the proportion that
suffers from hunger. According to the UN, the world is on track to meet the Millennium
Development goals of halving the proportion of the people living on less than a dollar a day (United
Nations Summit, 2010). However, the UN acknowledges that these achievements are largely the
result of extraordinary success in East Asia. It was noted that little progress had been made in SubSaharan Africa, where the poverty rate had declined by only a little more than 5 percent between
1990 and 2005.
Prior to the UN Millennium Development initiative, in 1999, the World Bank (WB) and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had introduced a new framework to reduce poverty. This
framework was introduced in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). This new
framework called for country-led strategy designed to enhance domestic accountability among the
most impoverished countries. The key elements of the enhanced framework were: 1) a
comprehensive understanding of poverty and its determinants; 2) choosing public actions that have
the highest poverty impact; and 3) choosing outcome indicators which are set and monitored using
participatory processes (International Monetary Fund/World Bank. 1999a). Ultimately, IMF and
the WB identified five principles in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers that underlie the approach:
1) country-ownership of a poverty reduction strategy is paramount (country driven); 2) an
understanding of the nature and determinants of poverty (results-oriented); 3) a poverty reduction
strategy should integrate institutional, structural and sectorial interventions (comprehensive); 4)
government development strategies that facilitate coordination with other institutions
(partnership); and 5) an understanding that poverty reduction will require institutional changes and
capacity building that will result in a long-term process/perspective (International Monetary
Fund/World Bank. 1999b).

International Journal of African Development v.3 n.3 Fall 2015

69

Key to any poverty reduction strategy and development is the ability of the nation to engage
in capacity building. Capacity building has been defined as the "process of developing and
strengthening the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources that organizations and
communities need to survive, adapt, and thrive in the fast-changing world."(Philbin, 1996)
Capacity building is said to encompass all the human, scientific, technological, organizational, and
institutional resource capabilities in a country with the goal of enhancing policy choices and modes
of implementation (United Nations, 1992). Capacity building occurs on many levels and successful
capacity building depends heavily upon human capacity (the individuals), organizational capacity
(groups of individuals), and institutional capacity (the formal rules and informal norms) (The
World Bank, 2005). There is no development without the ability of a nation, a people or a
community to enhance its potential to build its capacity. After all, development and poverty
reduction are about the community (the nation) empowering itself to bring about positive changes
and personal growth by transforming lives and society (Eade and Williams, 1995).
In the early 2000s, most African nations embraced the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
as the primary course of action to escape the strangle hold of poverty. The outcomes of the PRSP
were geared more toward structural development or building institutional capacity. In many ways,
the PRSP in Africa has focused largely on state or other non-government institutions to produce
poverty reduction strategies. Since its inception, the PRSP, especially as implemented in Africa,
has met with criticism and praise. Craig and Porter commended the PRSP for being a new
convergence of public policy around global integration and social inclusion on one hand, yet on
the other hand they raised concerns about structural tendency to favor the technical and juridical
over the political and economic (Craig and Porter, 2003). Ikhide and Obadan (2011) noted that the
capacity of most African governments to draw up sound economic policies and implementation of
them varied from country to country, but the real concern was that most Sub-Saharan nations did
not have the human resources and institutional capacity to undertake the type of analysis, design
programs and monitor their impacts. PRSP has been criticized in Africa for relying on externally
conceived interventions at the local scale, for not considering the social context and processes
through which problems are identified and solutions shaped, and for failing to address the
compromises to work out between different sectors of the community (Carr, 2008). Cheru (2006)
concluded that in Africa, much needs to be done if the PRSPs approach is to become more
participatory and result-oriented, and deal with the multi-dimensional nature of poverty.
Alternatively, successful poverty reduction requires consideration being given to human
capital development as well as increasing institutional capacity as suggested in the PRSPs. The
human capital capacity building strategy supports reform in those institutions that promotes
capacity building in areas such as human geography, education, health, housing, equality, personal
satisfaction, etc. There is a direct connection between capacity building in a structural context and
human capital development. The relationship is best described as one where the individual is
unable to achieve human capital development within the context of their personal abilities and
resources; however they are able to experience human capital development within the context of
the services delivered by the institutions in society. According to Nyong’o, the principal indicators
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of poverty reduction are those variables that measure improvements in the standards of living such
as education, health, housing, security and social solidarity or human dignity (Nyong’o, 2001).
Krishna (2007) suggested that the fastest way to reduce poverty is not to focus on whom
to target, but what to target. From this perspective, focusing on the reasons related to escaping
poverty are just as important as focusing on the reasons for falling into poverty. A study examining
the adoption of human strategies as a tool in the reduction of poverty in Africa found that intercountry differences in poverty levels can be accounted for by factors such as public expenditure
on education, primary school enrollment, female educational enrollment, expenditure on health,
and good governance (Arimah, 2004). Harber examined the political relationship between
education and poverty in Africa and concluded that education helps poverty reduction efforts by
fostering democracy and greater citizen participation in the political decision-making process
(Harber, 2002). A study of the effects of different types of government expenditures on services
in rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa showed that education’s effect on poverty reduction ranks
after agricultural research and extension, and road improvements (Fan and Zhang, 2008).
Gender equalities also remain an issue impacting poverty reduction efforts in Africa.
Mainly because of social expectations, young women’s enrollment in education and access to
employment continues to be a problem in poverty reduction (Jones and Chant, 2009). A recent
World Bank report that examined the link between inequality and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa
concluded that reducing gender based asset inequality increased growth, efficiency, and the
welfare of the household (Blackden and Bhanu, 1999). Similarly, it has been suggested that
migration factors into poverty reduction strategies. Poverty can and does cause migration and it
can also be caused by migration. On the whole, migration tends to serve as a factor alleviating
poverty [primarily because one of the benefits of migration is remittance] (Skeldon, 2002). The
intent here is not to determine cause, per se, or to test a theoretical explanation; rather it is to
explore how select indicators of human capital capacity building can influence poverty reduction
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Methods
The database used in this analysis were derived from a variety of sources including World
Bank’s Africa Database1, the United Nation Development Programme’s Human Development
Report’s Statistical Data1, and African Development Bank Indicators on African Countries.1
Although the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa are often thought of as one unit, we should not ignore
the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa is made up of forty-nine diverse nations with diverse populations
that are culturally and socially different. Given the relative newness of the country of Southern
Sudan, it was eliminated from database. Thus, the units of analysis are the 48 nations in SubSaharan Africa prior to 2011.
Capacity building often concerns a number of interdependent factors such as human
capital, socio-cultural capital, physical capital, financial capital and natural resources that
constrains people, governments and non-governmental organizations from improving the
population’s quality of life and overall well-being. Capacity building also involves the collective
ability of the people to respond to its collective needs. The collective human capital resources of
the nation will be the focus of capacity building in this paper. This study groups human capital
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capacity building resources into three categories: population/migration (or demographic
characteristics), education, and gender equality. The demographic factors allows us to paint a
picture of a nation’s most important aspects, it people. Information about the size of a nation’s
population, the growth characteristics, living conditions and spatial distribution are vital to the
policy formulation and implementation necessary for poverty reduction. Among the variables
examined about population and its movement were: the population size, growth, percent urban,
urban population growth, net migration, international migration median age, and life expectancy.
The collective educational attainment of the nation is a major criterion for human
development serving as a key component of individual well-being. The focus on the variables used
here are the educational characteristics of the nation’s younger population. Among the indicators
of net primary school enrollment, primary school completion rate, cohort moving to grade 5,
tertiary education gross enrollment. We also considered the adult literacy rate and the education
index. Empowering women is another major cornerstone of development. Not only does gender
equality contribute to the strength of the family and community, but it also increases the nation’s
overall human capital development. The measures of gender equality were the percentage of the
members parliament that were female, the ratio for girls to boys in primary school, the ratio for
girls to boys in secondary school, the male to female youth literacy ratio, female to male school
life ratio, the female to male labor force participation ratio and the gender inequality index.
The dependent variables was the country’s human development score. For purposes of this
study, two human development indicators were considered and the results compared. The United
Nations Development Programme has created a Human Development Index (HDI) that considers
the capabilities of the nation’s people as as a measure of development in the country.1 The HDI is
a composite index measuring average achievement of the nations’ population on several key
dimensions of human development, including: a long and health life, being knowledgeable and
having a decent standard of living. The closer the index is to 1.0 the greater the level of human
development in the nation. In 2013, there were no Sub-Saharan African nations in the very high
development group (above .890), only two in the high human development group, five in the
medium human development group and the remainder in the low human development group. The
average score for Sub-Saharan nations was 49.3.1
The second human development index used in this study was created by the Mo Ibrahim
Foundation. The Ibrahim Foundation focuses on issues of critical importance to leadership and
governance in Africa. The Ibrahim Foundation annually releases its Index of African governance.
The governance index is a comprehensive collection of data that covers four areas (pillars)
including: safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity
and human development. Ibrahim’s human development score reflects the success of a nation in
securing the well-being of the population, and it measures the extent the government provides
social protection, comprehensive education provisions and a health life (Ibrahim Foundation,
2014). Like the UNDP Human Development Index, the Ibrahim Human Development Scores
range from 0 to 100 with 100 being a perfect human development. The Sub-Saharan African nation
had an Ibrahim 2013 Human Development Score of 57.7 and the scores ranged from 14.1 to 85.6
with a standard deviation of 13.7.
Findings
This analysis begins with a descriptive look at some of the markers of human capital
capacity building from a sub-continual perspective. The aim is to paint a picture of the human
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capacity building indicators such as demographic characteristics, educational attainment, and
gender equality in Sub-Saharan Africa. Table 1, presents a portrait of the migration and population
capacity building characteristics for the average Sub-Saharan African nation. The median
population size was 11.3 million Sub-Saharan African nations in 2013 and this number is estimated
to rise to 16 million by 2030. The annual population growth rate for the average Sub-Saharan
nation was around 2.5 percent in 2013. Roughly 40 percent of the average nation’s population lives
in an urban area, and this number is changing by approximately 3.6 percent a year. Roughly 2.4
percent of the average nation’s population migrated out of the country in 2000 and the average
nation had a net migration of -1.5 in 2011. The median age in 2013 was 19.7 years. The life
expectancy for populations in the average Sub-Saharan nation was 56.6 years, and it ranged from
48.1 to 74.8 years.
Table 1
Descriptive Analysis of Select Indicators of Human Resources and Drivers of Capacity Building
across Sub-Sahara Africa
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Median

Standard

N

Deviation
Migration and Population
Population 2013 (in millions)

.1

173.5

19.5

11.3

29.7

48

Population Growth 2013

.35

3.8

2.5

2.3

.766

48

Percent urban 2012

11.7

86.8

40.6

39.3

16.8

47

Urban population growth 2012

.50

7.2

3.6

3.8

1.3

48

-24.8

5.3

-1.5

0.0

4.6

48

International migration 2000

.25

19.8

3.4

2.4

4.1

48

Median age 2013

15.1

33.9

19.7

19.0

3.7

47

Life expectancy 2013

48.1

74.3

56.6

55.8

6.6

48

Adult Literacy 2009/2012

25.3

94.2

63.5

66.8

19.3

48

Net primary school enrollment

26.7

98.8

75.0

78.9

17.8

43

Primary school completion rate
2009/2010

27.8

98.9

65.7

60.8

17.6

42

Cohort moving to grade 5 2008/2009

34.6

98.0

70.3

70.3

16.0

40

Tertiary education gross enrollment,
2003-2013

1.0

40

7.1

6.0

6.3

46

School life expectancy 2012

2.4

14.3

9.4

9.5

2.5

48

Net Migration 2011

Education
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Gender Equality
% parliament seats held by women
2013

3.0

51.9

20.3

16.7

11.5

47

Primary school completion girls to boys
ratio (2010/2012)

55.0

104

91.4

92.5

9.4

48

Secondary school girls to boys ratio
(2004/2010)

41

138.0

80.5

79.9

20.2

42

Youth female to male literacy ratio

44

114.9

89.4

93.8

14.9

44

Female to male labor force participation
ratio

26.3

88.1

62.3

65.7

17.9

47

School life expectancy ratio 2012

62.1

109.4

88.5

90.1

12.6

41

Gender Index 2013

37.5

70.70

57.6

59.1

8.0

35

Note. The ambition here was to provide information that has implications for the development of local,
national, and regional policies that will result in poverty reduction and sustainable growth on the subcontinent. More attention is needed to sort out the impact of various good governance measures on
improving human development and poverty reduction.

Educationally, the average Sub-Saharan African nation has an adult literacy rate around
66.8 percent. Approximately 75 percent of the age appropriate primary school age children were
enrolled, and the average nation had a primarily school completion rate in 2009/2010 of around
65.7 percent. Roughly 70 percent of that group age cohort moves on to the 5th grade. Between
2003 and 2013, seven percent of the population were enrolled in tertiary education in the average
Sub-Saharan nation. The average nation had an education index score of 43.3. The education index
scores ranged from 17.7 to 68.3 (the higher the score the better the level of educational attainment).
Disparities between males and females participation in government, education and the labor are
all great indicators of development. Woman held approximately 20 percent of the average
country’s parliament seats in 2013. The gender inequality index score was around 57.8 percent.
The lower the index score the greater the gender equality. The scores for Sub-Saharan African
nations ranged from 27.7 to 70.7. Despite to considerably high level of gender inequality, there
appears to be some positive movement in the area of gender equality in education among the youth.
The female to male ratio for boys and girls attending primary school averaged 91.4 (or.914), but
the girl-to-boy ratio (averaging 79.9 or .079) still lagged behind. The youth literacy female to male
ratio averaged 89.4 (or .894) percent. Nevertheless, the expected girl-to-boy school life ratio was
88.5 (or .885) in 2012 in the average nation. The ratio of female-to-males participation in the labor
force was 62.3 (or .623).
Table 2 provides an examination of the relationship and the amount of variation explained
between select demographic indicators and human development indexes. As shown in the table,
the size of the nation’s population was not significantly related with its level of human
development. Similarly, there was no significant association between the nation’s net migration
and human development or the percentage of the nation’s population migrating internationally and
human development. Of the population/migration variables examined, one of the stronger
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relationships was between the median age of the nation’s population and human development. An
increase in the nation’s median age was associated with an increase in human development. The
median age of the nation’s population explained .485 of the variation in the UNDP HDI and .290
in the IHDS. Similarly, life expectancy in 2013 explained more than one-third of the variation in
the nation’s human development score. An increase in the nation’s life expectancy was associated
with an increase in the nation’s HDI and IHDS human development index scores. Population and
urbanization population growth were also significantly associated with human development. The
relationship between population growth and human development was weak and it accounted for
only .10 of the variation across nations. Nevertheless, the data did show than an increase in
population growth was associated with a decrease in both the HDI and IHDS index scores. An
increase in the percent of the nation’s population living in an urban area was strongly associated
with the nation’s HDI score but was not significantly related with IDS index score. The percentage
of the population urban explained .222 of the variation in the HDI. However, urban growth was
negatively associated with human development according to both the HDI and IHDS. Urban
population growth explained .372 of the variation in the HDI, but only .097 of the variation in the
IHDS.
Table 2
Relationship between Select Migration and Population Capacity Indicators and Human
Development

Migration and Population

UNDP Human 2013
Development Index
Standardized
Adjusted
Beta

r2

Coefficient

Ibrahim Foundation 2013
Human Development Score
Standardized
Adjusted
Beta

r2

Coefficient

Population 2013 (in millions)

-.116

-.008

-.264

.049

Population Growth 2013

-345*

.100

-.369**

.117

Percent urban 2012

.489***

.222

.276

.055

Urban population growth 2012

-.621***

.372

-.341*

.097

Net Migration 2011

.025

-.022

.213

.025

International migration 2000

.176

.009

.142

-.001

Median age 2013

.704***

.485

.553***

.290

Life expectancy 2013

.633***

.388

.602***

.349

P *<.05 **<.01 ***<.001
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The collective educational attributes of the nation’s population is a key capacity building
indicator in any country, whether developing or developed. The data in Table 3 shows a positive
relationship between level education and human development. Primary school completion rate had
the strongest relationship with human development. Primary school completion explained more
than .400 of the variation in the nation’s HDI and IHDS scores. There was also a strong relationship
between the adult literacy rate and HDI and IHDS. The adult literacy explained upwards to .434
of the variation in the HDI and .283 in the IHDS. An increase in the adult literacy rate corresponded
with an increase in the nation’s human development. Although the data showed that an increase in
percent of the cohort moving to grade 5 and the percent of the population in enrolled in tertiary
education were positively related to an increase in the human development, the amount of the
variation explained in the nation’s human development scores was not as great as the adult literacy
or school life expectancy. The percent of the cohort moving to grade 5 was positively associated
with human development and explained .273 and .265 of the variation in the HDI and IHDS
respectively. While the gross enrollment in tertiary education between 2003 and 2013 explained
between .194 and .226 of the variation in the HDI and IHDS scores respectively. School life
expectancy explained the greatest amount of variation in both dependent measures. In both cases,
it explained greater than .500 of the variation. Of the education capacity indicators examined, the
weakest relationship was between net primary school enrollment rate and human development.
Nevertheless, net primary school enrollment rate explained between .194 and .226 in the HDI and
IHDS scores.
Table 3
Relationship between Select Education Capacity Indicators and Human Development Indicators
UNDP Human 2013
Development Index

Education

Adult Literacy 2009/2012
Net primary school enrollment
2010
Primary school completion rate
2009/2010
Cohort moving to grade 5
2008/2009
Tertiary education gross
enrollment, 2003-2013
School life expectancy 2012

Ibrahim Foundation Human
2013 Development Score

Standardized
Beta
Coefficient

Adjusted
r2

Standardized
Beta
Coefficient

Adjusted
r2

.703***
.392**

.483
.133

.546***
.473***

.283
.205

.699***

.434

.646***

.403

.540***

.273

.533***

.265

.461***

.194

.493***

.226

.727

.518

.741

.540

P *<.05 **<.01 ***<.001

Gender equality is also crucial to a community’s ability to augment its capacity.
Participation of women as decision-makers and equality in education is very important to human
development. An important gauge of gender equality is the percentage of seats held in the national
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parliament by women. The findings presented in Table 4 showed no significant relationship
between percentage of parliament seats held by women and human development. However, there
was a strong relationship between the gender inequality and human development. An increase in
the gender inequality index (meaning less equality) was associated with a strong decrease in the
nation’s human development score. Gender inequality explained more .500 of the variation in the
HDI and IHDS indexes. The ratio of girls-to-boys in secondary schools was also strongly
associated with human development. The ratio of girls-to-boys in secondary schools explained
around one-third of the variation in human development scores. An increase in the secondary
school ratio was associated with an increase in both the HDI and the IHDS indexes. While the
amount of variation explained by the girls-to-boys secondary school ratio was more consistent, the
variation in the two index explained by the girls-to-boys primary school ratio wasn’t consistent.
The primary school enrollment ratio explained more of the variation in the IHDS index than it did
in the HDI. The amount of variation explained ranged from .207 to .454 respectively. In both cases,
an increase in the girls-to-boys primary school enrollment ratio was positively associated with an
increase in human development. Finally, the female-to-male youth literacy ratio was also shown
to be significantly associated with human development. The female-to-male youth literacy ratio
by itself explained between .179 and .277 of the variance in the HIDS and the HDI indexes
respectively. An increase in the youth literacy ratio corresponded with an increase in the nation’s
level human development. The school life expectancy ratio nor the female-to-male ratio labor force
participation were not statistically related to human development
Table 4
Relationship between Select Gender Inequality Capacity Indicators and Human Development
Indicators
UNDP Human Development
Index

Gender Equality

% parliament seats held by
women 2013
Primary school girls to boys
ratio (2010/2012)
Secondary school girls to boys
enrollment ratio (2004/2010)
Youth female to male literacy
ratio
School life expectancy ratio
2012
Female to male labor force
participation ratio
Gender inequality Index 2013

Ibrahim Foundation Human
Development Score

Standardized
Beta
Coefficient

Adjusted
r2

Standardized
Beta
Coefficient

Adjusted
r2

.195

.016

.269

.052

.474***

.207

.682***

.454

.629***

.381

.627***

.378

.542***

.277

.445**

.179

.596

.338

.584

.325

-.063

-.019

-.090

-.014

-.743***

.538

-748***

.547

P *<.05 **<.01 ***<.001
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Multiple regression models examined the influence of the selected human capacity
indicators in each group on human development. Table 5 shows which combination of the select
population/migration variables explained the most variation in the human development indexes.
The model showed that the influence of total population, population growth, net migration, and
the percentage of population migrating internationally contributed to explaining the amount of
variation in the model was minimal. According to the HDI index, the nations with the highest
human development would have a larger percent of the population living in an urban area, however
the urban growth rate would be lower. The median age of the nation’s population would get older
and the life expectancy of the population would be higher. These four variables combined
explained .654 percent of the variation in the HDI index. The standardized regression coefficient
indicated that life expectancy was the strongest correlate (at .355) and the percent of the population
urban was the weakest (at .230).
Table 5
Modeling Population/Immigration Capacity Indicators Influence on Human Development
UNDP Human
Development Index
Score
Population 2013 (in millions)
Population Growth 2013
Percent of population urban 2012
Urban population growth 2012
Net Migration 2011
International migration 2000
Median age 2013
Life expectancy 2013
Constant
Adjusted R2

Ibrahim Foundation
Human Development
Score
-5.491* (2.093)

.132* (.059)
-2.139* (.025)

.821* (.384)
.562*** (.165)

1.203*** (.252)

2.544
.654

.319
.384

Beta Coefficient (error) *P<.05 **P < .01 ***P < .001

The best combination of population/migration variables only explained .384 of the
variation in the Ibrahim Foundation Human Development Score. The size of the total population
in 2013, the percentage of the population urban, the urban growth rate, net migration, international
migration or median age of the population were significant contributions to explaining the
variation in the IHDS index. However, the data indicated that population growth and life
expectancy combined to explain the variation. The model suggested that human development in
Sub-Saharan nations was predicated on a smaller population growth and greater life expectancy in
the population. The life expectancy of the population was the strongest correlate with human
development.
Among the education human capacity building indicators, the select variables explained
more of the variation in the HDI than the IHDS index score. As shown in Table 6, the best
combination of variables of education capacity building indicators explained .679 of the variation.
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The net primary school completion rate, cohort moving to grade 5 and the expected years of
schooling were not significant explanatory contributors. The tertiary education gross enrollment
was most strongly correlated with the HDI and a one unit increase in the gross enrollment resulted
in a .581 increase in the HDI score. Although the standardized coefficient between adult literacy
and the primary school completion rate and the HDI was similar than that of tertiary education
gross enrollment, the amount of change in the HDI produced by adult literacy and primary school
completion was not as great (.188 and .164 respectively). Nevertheless, the data suggested that a
nation with a high rate of human development would have a population with a higher level of adult
literacy, a higher primary school completion rate, and higher tertiary education gross enrollment.
The best combination of variables explaining the variation in the IHDS were the percent of the
cohort moving up to grade 5 and the expected years of schooling. These two variables explained
.558 of the variation in the IHDS. The expected years of school was most highly correlated with
IHDS. The model suggested that a nation with a high IHDS would have a higher percent of the
cohort moving to grade 5 and expected years of schooling would also be higher.
Table 6
Modeling Education Capacity Indicators Influence on Human Development
UNDP Human
Development Index
Score

Ibrahim Foundation
Human Development
Score

Education Indicators

Adult Literacy 2009/2012
Net primary school enrollment 2010
Primary school completion rate 2009/2010
Cohort moving to grade 5 2008/2009
Tertiary education gross enrollment, 2003-2013

.188** (.062)
.164** (.062)
.292** (626)
.581*** (.056)

Expected years of schooling 2012

Constant
Adjusted R2

3.253** (.626)
21.420
.679

7.037
.558

Beta Coefficient (error) *P<.05 **P < .01 ***P < .001

Unlike the relationship between the population/migration and education indicators, the
gender equality variables that explained most of the variation in human development were
consistent across indexes. For both human development indicators, the gender inequality index
was the major factor associated with human development. The data in Table 7 shows that an
increase in gender equality was associated with an increase in human development. Ironically, an
increase in the percent of parliament seats held by women was not positively associated with the
human development index scores. Similarly, it was ironic that there was a negative association
between the labor force participation female-to-male ratio and the IHDS score. Overall, the data
indicates that a nation with more gender equality, a smaller percentage of the parliament seats held
by women, and fewer women in the work force than men would have a higher level of human
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development. These measures of gender equality explained .705 of the variation in the HDI and
.692 in the IHDS.
Table 7
Modeling Gender Inequality Capacity Indicators Influence on Human Development

Gender Equality
% parliament seats held by women 2013
Primary school girls to boys ratio (2010/2012)
Secondary school girls to boys ratio (2004/2010)
Youth male to female literacy ration
Labor force participation female to male ratio 2010
Women share of the labor force
Gender inequality Index 2013
Constant
Adjusted R2

UNDP Human
Development Index
Score

Ibrahim Foundation
Human Development
Score

-.287** (.104)

-.344* (131)

-.134* (.049)
-1.215*** (.151)

-1.468*** (.190)

123.834
.705

-12.375
.692

Beta Coefficient (error) *P<.05 **P < .01 ***P < .001

A composite model of the select human capacity building indicators influence on human
development was created by entering all of the indicators in the equation and using the forward
elimination process.1 The combination of the variables explaining a significant amount of the
variation in both the HDI and IHDS should give some indication of the characteristics of a nation
that is developed in Sub-Saharan Africa. As shown in Table 8, the variables that significantly
influenced the variation in HDI included the percent of the population urban, the urban population
growth, and the percent of the primary school’s cohort moving to grade 5 and gender equality.
Combined, these variables explained .886 of the variation in the HDI. On the other hand, the
variables that are significantly influenced the IHDS were similar to those influencing the HDI.
These variables included the percent of the population urban, the female-to-male labor force ratio,
and the gender equality index. These three variables combined to explain .812 of the variation in
the IHDS. What the findings suggests is that a Sub-Saharan African nation with a higher human
development score would have a larger percentage of it population urban, yet the urban population
growth would be smaller. The percentage of the primary school population moving with their
cohort to grade 5 would be larger. A smaller percentage of the female population would be part of
the labor market. Finally, the level of gender equality would be considered higher.
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Table 8
Models Showing the Best Combination of the Select Human Capacity Building Indicators
Influencing Human Capital Development

Percent of population urban 2012
Urban population growth 2012
Cohort moving to grade 5 2008/2009
Female-to-Male labor force ratio
Gender inequality Index 2013
Constant
Adjusted R2

UNDP Human
Development Index Score

Ibrahim Foundation
Human Development
Score

.241*** (.061)
-1.393* (.636)
.135* (.055)
---.810*** (.106)

.425*** (.080)
-----.122** (.038)
-1.250*** (.132)

81.332.
.866

125.099
.812

Table 8 about here (See appendices).
Discussion
In analyzing the select human capital capacity building markers, the findings suggest that
the educational indicators were among the strongest in explaining the variation in human
development. In particular, they suggested that among the strongest indicators of human
development in the average Sub-Saharan African nation were the adult literacy rate, the school life
expectancy, the primary school completion rate and the percent of cohort moving to grade 5.
Although individually it appears that educational indicators were among the strongest when it
came to human development, there was also strong evidence that gender equality was also a
significant factor explaining the variation in human development across the nations of SubSaharan nations. The gender equality index showed that gender inequality was a serious inhibitor
of human development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The data, in general, suggested that equality in the
expected years of school and the enrollment in secondary schools between girls and boys increase
the level of human development in the average Sub-Saharan African nation. However, there was
no evidence that the percent of legislative seats held by women were a factor. Among the
migration/population factors these findings suggest that an over population and a higher overall
life expectancy are key to increasing human development in Sub-Saharan nation.
From the findings we also have an indication of what combination of factors within each
group have the strongest impact of human development in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the
findings suggests that the combination of the select population/immigration factors indicates that
a country with a high level of development would have a larger percentage of the population living
in urban areas, however the urban growth rate would be smaller. In addition, the life expectancy
in the country would be higher, the median age of the nation’s population would be older, and
overall population growth would be smaller. Educationally, the adult literacy rate would be higher,
the primary school completion rate would be higher, and a larger percent of the population would
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go on to tertiary education as expected. The Ibrahim Foundation Human Development Score
indicated that the percent of the cohort moving to grade 5 would be larger and the expected years
of schooling would be higher. Finally, a nation with a higher level of human development as
expected would also have greater gender equality. Overall, when all of the selected indicators are
consider together. The data indicated that the best predictors of human development was a larger
percent of the population urban, however urban population growth would be slower and the ratio
of female to males in the labor force would smaller. The final aspect of a nation with greater human
development would be a higher degree of gender equality.
The findings of this paper lends support to the underlying belief that poverty reduction
cannot be confined to enhancing and understanding capacity building as an institutional level
activity or only as an economic phenomenon. Capacity building must also be understood in terms
of humans as a collective resource. Thus, poverty reduction depends heavily on understanding
human populations as a collective of social, political and economic organizations. Consequently,
policy development must take into account the collective human characteristics of the community,
the nation, and the continent. Based on the findings, several policy suggestions are warranted. If
Sub-Saharan Africa is to become economically viable and competitive in an increasingly
globalized world, the nations and regions must develop educational policies that will increase
literacy, the mean years of formal education, and gender equality. Organizations like the African
Union, the United Nations African Development Programs, The World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund should embarked upon a development strategy that encourages and rewards those
nations that develop (and meet) a minimum continental educational standard that achieve these
goals. Such a policy would stress access to quality public education for all school age children. It
would develop programs that help the nations in Sub-Saharan improve the quality of public
education. The nations in this area of the world must embrace and vigorously enforce educational
policies that ensure gender equality and equity in the public education system. Perhaps most
importantly, the policies must be considerate of the cultural and social characteristics of the
population.These policies should also be inclusive from a bottom-up strategy as oppose to a topdown strategy.
Hence, the findings lend support to the adoption of an integrated policy approach that takes
into consideration communal-wide social development alongside with economic development as
a means to reduce poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. The social component of the strategy would
emphasize the collective human capital development while the economic component would
employ an inclusive growth strategy. The inclusive growth model was first introduced in India and
focused on improving the delivery of core public services, and spreading the benefits of economic
growth more widely among the population (The World Bank, 2006). According to the Report,
essential to inclusive growth is improving the delivery of core public services such as healthcare,
education, power, and clean drinking water. It also stressed investments made in infrastructure,
such that they create jobs for low and semi-skilled workers. Rapidinclusive growth and sustained
poverty reduction requires inclusive growth that allows all citizens to contribute to the social,
political, and economic development of nation (Ianchovichian and Lunstrom, 2009).
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Conclusion
More research is needed that explores the social and political dynamics of Sub-Saharan
African nations of poverty reduction. Too often poverty reduction is considered as a phenomenon
that occurs primarily within an economic context and at the individual or institutional level. The
intent here is to broaden the focus by considering how the collective social (or socio-political)
characteristics of the population also influence poverty reduction.
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Partners’ Diversification and Exposure of African Countries to
International Crises: The Case of Kenya
Giscard Assoumou Ella, University of Omar Bongo, Gabon
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to characterize the exposure of Kenyan's income to
international income, monetary and price shocks. The results suggest that the partners’
diversification permits them to resist to international shocks. In fact, Chinese conjuncture
tends to be less exposed to OECD countries' income and inflation shocks. Also, income in
this country more depends on domestic investment and household consumption, in
comparison to the exposure to OECD country shocks. In this context, we observe that the
exposure of Kenyan income to OECD shocks regresses when the dependence to Chinese
conjuncture progresses.
Key Words: international crises, coupling and decoupling, economic conjuncture, African,
developed and Chinese economies, SVAR

African countries essentially produce and export the raw materials toward advanced
economies (Madeley, 2003) and import the finished goods for the household consumption. In these
conditions, they are exposed to economic fluctuations of the trade partners and world prices of raw
materials. For instance, Berman and Martin (2012) study the exposure of external trade of SubSaharan African countries to international financial crises and document that an industrial
international crisis would have a big impact on their economies because they export the raw
materials. However, they analyze the impacts of the international price fluctuations and the world
demand on exports and imports of African countries. They conclude at the exposure, without
measuring the effect on domestic income. In a first step, Assoumou Ella and Bastidon Gilles (2015)
develop a model for measuring the fluctuations of domestic income in African countries caused
by the impacts of the international shocks on their external trade. In the second step, Assoumou
Ella (2014) extends this model with the inclusion of the external real and financial exchanges.
However, the two analyses consider a world composed from two countries, while in the recent
years the increase of Chinese investments in Africa and the development of the trade exchanges
between African countries and China are observed (Hugon, 2012).
Also in many recent studies, it is argued that economic cycles of Asian emerging countries
are not synchronized with the cycles in developed economies. Using a GVAR model, Dées and
Vansteenkiste (2007) argue that the Chinese growth is relatively immune to world economic
shocks. Lambert and Chavy-Martin (2008) confirm this result. In fact, using a correlation matrix
of the economic growths and a FSVAR model inspired to Stock and Watson (2005), they document
that the Chinese growth depends on domestic household consumption, investment and regional
integration.
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In this context, the exchanges of African countries with China can lead them to be less
exposed to shocks of the developed countries. However, there is no consensus about the
decoupling assumption in the literature. Kim et al. (2009), for example, argue that economic
interdependencies are still strong between emerging Asian economies and developed countries,
despite the increase of the Asian regional trade.
Taking into account the above, the objective of this paper is to develop a model of the
exposure of an African country to shocks of a developed country, according the cases of coupling
or decoupling economic conjunctures of developed and emerging countries. In theoretical model,
we aim to measure the level of the exposure of an African country’s income and real exchange
rate to income, prices and monetary shocks in the developed country, and the index of the world
prices of raw materials exported by the African country. However, for the data availability, we
limit empirical model on the verification of the coupling-decoupling assumption and the exposure
of developing country's income to international income and inflation shocks taking into account
Chinese conjuncture. The ultimate objective is to verify whether the dependence of a developing
country towards Chinese economy increases in the recent years and whether the exposure to
international shocks decreases. Thereby, are the intensification of exchanges between Africa and
China a solution for African countries to resist to shocks of the developed economies?
The paper is organized as following: the formalization of the theoretical model is subject of Section
2. In the Section 3, we proceed at the empirical verification using Kenyan economy.
Theoretical Model
We formalize the exposure of an African country's income to international shocks basing
our analysis on the “locomotive” theory that argues that the fluctuations observed in economy
impact the other economies through external trade (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Baxter and
Kouparitsas, 2004) and financial liquidity flows (Kose et al. 2003; Imbs, 2004). The standard
approach generally inspired by classical and neoclassical models use the production functions in
order to study the determinants of output. Based on factors of production (capital, labor,
technology ...), they describe a world composed of firms with idealist assumptions like "pure and
perfect competition", while they are not always the case in real economy. Also, the output in
African countries is essentially the fact of staffing raw material (Madeley, 2003), and not factors
of production. In this context, we do not analyze the determinants of output in terms of factors of
production, but the fluctuations of the value of this output according to the variations of
international demand. Thereby, the analysis is based on the value (quantity*price) and the
exchange flows. Inspired to Assoumou Ella (2014), the objective is to measure the fluctuations of
income flows in African countries caused by the fluctuations of a developed country's income
flows, the international prices and monetary shocks. This is analyzed taking into account the
demand of goods and services and financial flows provided by China to see if the value of output
flow in African countries is more (or less) exposed to the preceding international shocks, according
to the increase of their dependence to Chinese economy. In this context, we retain the following
assumptions:
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H1: the world is composed of three countries: a developed country (A), a developing country (B)
and an emerging country (C). Based on the “locomotive” theory, we can argue that the trade and
the financial liquidity flows exist and they conduce to the interdependencies between these three
countries. However, we limit our area on the study of the dependence of the developing country
to shocks of the developed country, taking into account the presence (or not) of decoupling
economic conjunctures of emerging and developed countries. (B) has the characteristics of the
African economies. It exports the raw materials towards (A) and (C), and imports finished products
from these two countries.
H2: the economy of (B) is composed of two sectors: one exposed to external exchanges and the
other depending on the domestic variables (health, domestic investment, public expenditure…).
H3: GDP in (B) is significantly explained by external trade variables (Ayhan Kose & Riezman,
2001; Dutta & Ahmed, 2004; Thurlow, 2007; Mbabazi et al. 2008; Fernandez Puente et al. 2009),
international tourism arrivals (Eugenio-Martin et al. 2004; Mitchell & Ashley, 2007; Fayissa et al.
2008; Olayinka Idowu, 2009), migrant transfers (Jongwanich, 2007; Ajayi et al. 2009; GarciaFuentes & Kenedy, 2009; Fayissa & Nsiah, 2010), external debt (Kwasi Fosou, 1996; Clements et
al. 2003; Pattilo et al. 2011), foreign aid (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Almeida & Fernandes, 2008;
Schiff & Wang, 2008; Herzer & Morrissey, 2010), Foreign Direct Investment and other private
financial flows (Carkovic & Levine, 2005; Ayanwale, 2007; Sukar et al. 2007; Magnus Frimpong
& Fosu Oteng-Abayie, 2008; De Vita & Kyaw, 2009; Brambila-Macias et al. 2011).
H4: the income, price and monetary shocks of (A), the income shocks of (C) and the prices of the
raw materials shocks impact the external variables of (B) enumerated in H3 (Thomas & Gosse,
2001; Naudé & Saayman, 2005; Adams & Richard, 2008; Aslan et al. 2009; Cali & Dell’Erba,
2009; Dabla-Norris et al. 2010; Jan Singh et al. 2011; Berman & Martin, 2012; Assoumou Ella &
Bastidon Gilles, 2015).
H5: The trade exchanges are made in the currency of the developed country that is the international
currency.
Using H2 and H3, we formalize the value of the income flow of (B) as following:
𝛼

𝛽

𝑌𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡 0 × 𝑍𝑡

(1)

With 𝛼0 ∈ ]−∞; +∞[ and 𝛽 ∈ ]0; +∞[
Y represents the value of income flow, X the vector of the value of foreign variable flows
enumerated in H3, Z the vector of the value of domestic variable flows enumerated in H2, 𝛼0 the
elasticity of Y with respect to X, 𝛽 the elasticity of Y with respect to Z and t, the time. 𝛼0 ∈
]−∞; +∞[: in the empirical recent literature review concerning the effects of the variables
included in the vector X on the domestic income in developing countries, it is demonstrated that
the relationship can be positive or negative. In the case of the imports, for example, they have a
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positive effect on the domestic income if they are the imports of capital goods for domestic
investment (Ugur, 2008; Cetintas & Barisik, 2009), and the effect is negative concerning the
imports of consumption goods (Fernandez Puente et al. 2009; Ullah et al. 2009). In the case of
migrant transfers, the effect on the domestic income is ambiguous. There is a positive relationship
between these two variables (Wooddruff & Zenteno, 2004; Yang, 2005; Rapoport & Docquier,
2005). The effect can be negative, taking into account the levels of education of the migrants (Stark
& Levhari, 1982; Ahlburg, 1991; Chami et al. 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2004). 𝛽 ∈
]−∞; +∞[ because education and health have a positive effect on income in African countries and
the bad quality of the institutions and the public infrastructures negatively affect income.
Then, based on H1, H4 and H5, we formalize the dependence of the value of trade and
financial variable flows of the vector X, to value of income flows, price and monetary variables of
(A), controlled of the dependence to the value of income flow of (C):
𝜑

𝜌

𝜏

𝜎

̇ 0 × 𝑝̇𝑡 0 × 𝑟̇𝑡 0 × 𝑝𝑝𝑡0 × 𝑌2𝑡
̇𝑎
𝑋𝑡 = 𝑒1𝑡 × 𝑒3𝑡 × 𝑌1𝑡

(2)

With 𝜑0 ∈ ]0; +∞[, 𝜌0 ∈ ]−∞; +∞[, 𝜏0 ∈ ]−∞; +∞[, 𝜎0 ∈ ]−∞; +∞[ and 𝑎 ∈ ]0; +∞[
𝑌1̇ represents the value of income flow of (A), 𝑝̇ the inflation in (A), 𝑟̇ the central bank’s director
interest rate in (A), 𝑝𝑝 the index of the world prices of the raw materials exported by (B) whose
the formalization takes into account the weight of each commodity exported in its economy, 𝑌2̇ the
value of income flow of (C), 𝜑0 the elasticity of X with respect to 𝑌1̇ , 𝜌0 the elasticity of X with
respect to 𝑝̇ , 𝜏0 the elasticity of X with respect to 𝑟̇ , 𝜎0 the elasticity of X with respect to 𝑝𝑝 and a
the elasticity of X with respect to 𝑌2̇ . We multiply X by 𝑒1 and 𝑒3 (the nominal exchange rate
between (B) and (A), (B) and (C)) for the conversion in money of (B). 𝜑0 ∈ ]0; +∞[ and 𝑎 ∈
]0; +∞[: income flows of (A) and (C) have a positive effect on foreign variables of (B). 𝜌0 ∈
]−∞; +∞[: the effect of inflation in (A) on some external variable flows of (B) can be positive or
negative. In the case of the migrant transfers, for example, inflation in (A) decreases the purchasing
power of the migrants, and therefore their transfers. 𝜏0 ∈ ]−∞; +∞[: the effect of monetary policy
in (A) on the external variables of (B) can be positive or negative. An expansive monetary policy
that increases income and the demand, for example, can decrease the exports of (A) towards (B).
On the other hand, this monetary policy can increase the migrant transfers. 𝜎0 ∈ ]−∞; +∞[: the
effect of the prices of the raw materials on the external variable flows can be positive or negative.
For instance, a decrease in this index can reduce the value of the exports of (B) and increase the
level of the migrant transfers, for example.
In the assumption of coupling economic conjunctures of (A) and (C), we can write the
value of income flow in (C) with the part exposed to the value of income flow, price and monetary
shocks of (A) and the part depending on other variables (domestic household consumption,
investment, regional trade…) as following:
̇ = 𝑒2𝑡 × 𝑌1𝑡
̇ 𝑏 × 𝑝̇ 𝑡𝑐 × 𝑟̇𝑡𝑑 × 𝑍̇𝑡𝑓
𝑌2𝑡
(3)
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With: 𝑒2 the nominal exchange rate between (C) and (A) for the conversion in the currency of (C),
b the elasticity of 𝑌2̇ with respect to 𝑌1̇ , c the elasticity of 𝑌2̇ with respect to 𝑝̇ and d the elasticity
of 𝑌2̇ with respect to 𝑟̇ , 𝑍̇ the vector of the others determinants of income in (C) and f the elasticity
of 𝑌2̇ with respect to 𝑍̇.
In replacing (3) in (2), we have:
𝜎0
𝑓×𝑎
𝑎
̇ (𝜑0 +𝑎×𝑏) × 𝑝̇𝑡(𝜌0 +𝑎×𝑐) × 𝑟̇𝑡(𝜏0 +𝑎×𝑑) × 𝑝𝑝𝑡
𝑋𝑡 = 𝑒1𝑡 × 𝑒2𝑡
× 𝑒3𝑡 × 𝑌1𝑡
× 𝑍̇𝑡

(4)

According to (4), in the situation of coupling economic conjunctures between (A) and (C),
the external variables of (B) can be formalized taking into account their dependence on economic
conjuncture of (A) measured by 𝜑0 , 𝜌0 and 𝜏0 , the vector 𝑍̇ measured by (𝑓 × 𝑎), the dependence
of 𝑌2̇ to economic conjuncture of (A) measured by 𝑎 × 𝑏, 𝑎 × 𝑐 and 𝑎 × 𝑑, and also their
dependence on index of the prices of the raw materials measured by 𝜎0 .
Using the equations (1) and (4), we can measure the level of the exposure of the value of
income flow in (B) to shocks of (A) and the raw material prices index through exports, imports,
international tourism, migrant transfers, Aid, external debt, FDI and other external private financial
flows in the situation where the economic conjunctures of (A) and (C) are coupled.
𝛼
𝑎×𝛼
𝛼
𝛽
𝜎1
𝑎
̇ (𝜑1 +𝜑2 ) × 𝑝̇𝑡(𝜌1 +𝜌2) × 𝑟̇𝑡(𝜏1 +𝜏2) × 𝑝𝑝𝑡
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑒1𝑡0 × 𝑒2𝑡 0 × 𝑒3𝑡0 × 𝑌1𝑡
× 𝑍̇𝑡 2 × 𝑍𝑡
(5)
With: 𝜑1 = 𝜑0 × 𝛼0 , 𝜌1 = 𝜌0 × 𝛼0 , 𝜏1 = 𝜏0 × 𝛼0 , 𝜎1 = 𝜎0 × 𝛼0 , 𝜑2 = 𝑎 × 𝑏 × 𝛼0 , 𝜌2 = 𝑎 ×
𝑐 × 𝛼0 , 𝜏2 = 𝑎 × 𝑑 × 𝛼0 , 𝑎2 = 𝑓 × 𝑎 × 𝛼0
According to (5), if the economic conjunctures of (A) and (C) are coupled, the value of
income flow of (B) is exposed to the value of income flow shocks of (A) by 𝜑1 directly and by 𝜑2
through the income flow of (C), inflation shocks by 𝜌1 directly and by 𝜌2 indirectly, monetary
shocks by 𝜏0 directly and by 𝜏2 indirectly, the other determinants of the income flow in (C) by 𝑎2
and the raw material shocks by 𝜎1 , through the external flows enumerated in X. In the case of the
decoupling economic conjunctures of (A) and (C), we replace (2) in (1) and the equation (5)
becomes:
𝛼
𝛼
𝜎1
̇ 𝜑1 × 𝑝̇𝑡𝜌1 × 𝑟̇𝑡𝜏1 × 𝑝𝑝𝑡
̇ 𝑎1 × 𝑍𝑡𝛽
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑒1𝑡0 × 𝑒3𝑡0 × 𝑌1𝑡
× 𝑌2𝑡

(6)

With 𝑎1 = 𝑎 × 𝛼0
In the period of the crisis in (A), the dependence of income flow in (B) to income flow of
(C) and the vector Z permits the developing country to resist to the contagion of the crisis. This
conclusion is in favor of the partners’ diversification in Africa. Taking into account the fact that
the Chinese economy tends to be decoupling with the developed economies because its growth
depends on domestic household consumption, investment and regional integration (Dées and
Vansteenkiste, 2007 and Lambert and Chavy-Martin, 2008), we recommend that African countries
increase their exchanges with China. Thereby, they will be less exposed to international shocks.
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Also we can use the equations (5) and (6) for measuring the imported inflation from (A) to (B).
𝑝̇

Knowing that 𝑒𝑟1𝑡 = 𝑒1𝑡 × (𝑝𝑡), with 𝑒𝑟1 and p, the real exchange rate and inflation in (B) (𝑒1𝑡 =
𝑡

𝑝𝑡

𝑒𝑟1𝑡 × (𝑝̇ )), we replace 𝑒𝑟1𝑡 with its value in (5) and (6) and we apply the logarithm:
𝑡

1

𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑟1𝑡 ) = 𝛼 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑡 −

𝜑1 +𝜑2
𝛼0

0

𝜎1
𝛼0

𝑎2

𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑝𝑡 ) − 𝛼

0

̇ ) + {𝛼0 −(𝜌1 +𝜌2)} 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝̇𝑡 ) − (𝜏1 +𝜏2 ) 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟̇𝑡 ) −
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌1𝑡
𝛼
𝛼
0

0

𝛽
𝑍̇𝑡 − 𝛼 log(𝑍𝑡 ) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑡 ) − 𝑎 log(𝑒2𝑡 ) − log(𝑒3𝑡 )

(7)

0

In the case when the cycles of the economic conjunctures of (A) and (C) are synchronized,
̇ appreciates 𝑒𝑟1𝑡 by 𝜑1 directly, and through the dependence between the incomes
an increase in 𝑌1𝑡
̇ ). The global effect is 𝜑1 +𝜑2.
of (A) and (C) by 𝜑2 indirectly (and conversely for a decrease in 𝑌1𝑡
𝛼0

An increase in 𝑝̇ 𝑡 has two effects on 𝑒𝑟1𝑡 : a positive effect that is in conformity with the formula
of the real exchange rate, and a negative effect that characterizes the imported inflation measured
by 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 . 𝜌1 represents the direct effect and 𝜌2 the indirect effect (and conversely for a decrease
of 𝑝̇𝑡 ). The global effect is

{𝛼0 −(𝜌1 +𝜌2 )}
𝛼0

. An expensive monetary policy in (A) appreciates the real

exchange rate of (B). A decrease of 𝑟̇ has a positive effect on the demand and investment in (A),
and therefore 𝑌1̇ . It increases the demand of the raw materials (the exports of (B)) according to the
stocks of the firms, and their prices. The firms in (A) and (C) increase the prices of the finished
products to respond to the surplus of the demand in (A) and (B) (the demand in (B) increases with
the value of the exports) and the increase of the prices of raw materials. Thereby, this leads to
imported inflation in (B) by the imports channel (See H1). The devaluation of the currency in (A)
appreciates the real exchange rate of (B), because it leads to imported inflation like the expensive
monetary policy. More 𝑍̇ impacts the income of (C), more the real exchange rate of (B) can resist
𝑎
to shocks of (A), according to the intensity of the relationship between Y and 𝑍̇ measured by 𝛼2 ,
0

and conversely.
In case when the cycles of the economic conjunctures of (A) and (C) are not synchronized,
the equation (7) becomes:
1

𝜑

̇ )+
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑟1𝑡 ) = 𝛼 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑡 − 𝛼 1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌1𝑡
0

𝑎1
𝛼0

0

(𝛼0 −𝜌1 )
𝛼0

𝜏

𝜎

𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝̇ 𝑡 ) − 𝛼1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟̇𝑡 ) − 𝛼1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑝𝑡 ) −
0

𝛽

̇ ) − log(𝑍𝑡 ) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑡 ) − log(𝑒3𝑡 )
log(𝑌2𝑡
𝛼
0

0

(8)

The exposure of the real exchange rate of (B) to shocks in (A) is mitigated by the dependence of
its economy to income of (C) and the vector Z.
Empirical Verification: The Case of Kenya
The objective of this section is to do an empirical verification of theoretical model in
Kenyan economy. We limit the investigation on the exposure of GDP in Kenya to international
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income and inflation shocks. According to Hugon (2012) African countries diversify their external
exchanges in the recent years with the increase of Chinese investments and the development of the
trade exchanges with this country. Also, according to Dées and Vansteenkiste (2007) and Lambert
and Chavy-Martin (2008), economic cycles of Asian Emerging countries tend not to be
synchronized with the cycles in developed economies, because Asian growth is essentially
determined by the domestic household consumption and investment. In this context, we do two
estimations with two periods of study: 1960-2006 and 1960-2012. The second period includes the
recent international crisis. The objective is to view if taking into account the recent years decreases
the exposure of Chinese economy to international shocks, increases the dependence of Kenya
economy to Chinese economy, and therefore decreases the exposure of Kenya economy to
international shocks. For doing this, we use correlation matrix of conjuncture variable cycles and
a SVAR model.
Correlation Matrix of Conjuncture Variable Cycles
Table 1
Correlation Matrix of Conjuncture Variable Cycles; end 2006
gdpoecd infoecd hcchina invchina gdpchina gkenya xkenya invkenya mkenya imkenya infkenya gdpkenya
gdpocde 1.0000
infocde -0.2276 1.0000
hcchina 0.9416 -0.4079 1.0000
invchina 0.9646 -0.3418 0.9806 1.0000
gdpchina 0.9524 -0.4005 0.9975 0.9902 1.0000
gkenya 0.9661 -0.0542 0.8958 0.9283 0.9080 1.0000
xkenya 0.9799 -0.1097 0.9181 0.9482 0.9315 0.9839 1.0000
invkenya 0.9524 -0.0064 0.8639 0.9088 0.8786 0.9888 0.9719 1.0000
mkenya 0.9753 -0.1148 0.9224 0.9523 0.9356 0.9899 0.9941 0.9800 1.0000
imkenya -0.9090 -0.0991 -0.7742 -0.8281 -0.7909 -0.9518 -0.9274 -0.9567 -0.9220 1.0000
infkenya 0.4524 0.2658 0.2726 0.3494 0.2964 0.3991 0.4604 0.4213 0.4101 -0.4868 1.0000
gdpkenya 0.9822 -0.1358 0.9256 0.9513 0.9372 0.9944 0.9904 0.9807 0.9951 -0.9324 0.3948 1.0000

Table 2
Correlation Matrix of Conjuncture Variable Cycles; end 2012
gdpoecd infoecd hcchina
gdpocde 1.0000
infocde -0.3410 1.0000
hcchina 0.9249 -0.5063
invchina 0.9494 -0.4614
gdpchina 0.9335 -0.5017
gkenya 0.9703 -0.2272
xkenya 0.9741 -0.2804
invkenya 0.9588 -0.1958
mkenya 0.9678 -0.2888
imkenya -0.9246 0.1114
infkenya 0.4178 0.2506
gdpkenya 0.9800 -0.2964
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invchina gdpchina gkenya xkenya invkenya mkenya imkenya infkenya gdpkenya

1.0000
0.9882
0.9985
0.9183
0.9432
0.9016
0.9487
-0.8440
0.2333
0.9420

1.0000
0.9938 1.0000
0.9435 0.9267 1.0000
0.9642 0.9518 0.9870 1.0000
0.9334 0.9113 0.9919 0.9796 1.0000
0.9686 0.9570 0.9898 0.9959 0.9843 1.0000
-0.8797 -0.8543 -0.9639 -0.9472 -0.9680 -0.9433 1.0000
0.2949 0.2516 0.3570 0.3975 0.3736 0.3555 -0.4227 1.0000
0.9622 0.9499 0.9956 0.9927 0.9864 0.9951 -0.9506 0.3507 1.0000
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Domestic income in (B) used in the theoretical model is approximated by real GDP in
Kenya (gdpkenya), income in (A) (international income) by real OECD GDP (gdpoecd), world
price by the harmonized inflation in OECD countries (infoecd), household consumption in China
(hcchina), investment in China (invchina) and real GDP of China (gdpchina). Also, we have the
following domestic variables: public expenditure (gkenya), exports (xkenya), investment
(invkenya), imports (mkenya), infantile mortality (imkenya) and inflation (infkenya). The
correlations of real GDP OECD cycles with household consumption, investment and real GDP in
China are 94%, 96% and 95% in the first period. They become 92%, 94% and 93% in the second
period. Thereby, the correlation of the cycles decreases in the three cases. The correlation of the
cycles between GDP, household consumption and investment in China are 99.7% and 99% in the
first period, 99.8% and 99.4% in the second period. Contrary to the cycle correlations with real
GDP OECD, we observe an increase in the second period. Also, the cycles of Chinese GDP are
most correlated by the two domestic variables in comparison with the correlation with GDP
OCDE. In case of Kenya, its GDP cycles are correlated with GDP OECD by 98.22% in the first
period, and 98% in the second period. They become 93% in the first period and 95% in the second
period, concerning the correlation with Chinese GDP. In this context, we observe a small decrease
in the cycle correlations with the conjuncture of OCDE countries and an increase in the correlation
with the Chinese cycles. We deduce that there are cycle synchronizations between OECD and
Chinese conjunctures, but its intensity decreases. Also, confirming literature, the intensity of the
cycle correlations between investment, household consumption and GDP in China increases. The
conjuncture cycle correlations between Kenya and OECD decrease. They increase with China.
Empirical Model Specification: a SVAR
The SVAR model used in this study is inspired by Parnisari (2002). The theoretical model
developed in section 2, has the variables of a real economy. The utilization of VAR models for
estimating these types of models has been popularized by Diebold (1998) who introduces the VAR
models in economic literature in the 80s. Thereby, under stationary condition, it is possible to
apply the Wold theorem and to present a vector 𝑦𝑡 , like equations (5) and (6), in the form of a
Vector Moving Average (VMA). In this context, we suppose that Kenyan economy is described
by a VAR (p) with the polynomial form:
∅(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜀𝑡

(9)

With 𝑦𝑡 the vector of n endogeneous variables with (𝑛 × 1) dimensions, t the time, p the number
of the retards, c the constant with (𝑛 × 1) dimensions, L the operator of retards (𝐿𝑛 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−𝑛 ), ∅
the matrix of retard polynomials (∅(𝐿) = 𝐼𝑛 − ∅1 𝐿 − ∅2 𝐿2 − ⋯ − ∅𝑝 𝐿𝑝 ), with 𝐼𝑛 an identity
matrix with (𝑛 × 𝑛) dimensions, ∅1 , … , ∅𝑝 the matrix of the coefficients with (𝑛 × 𝑛) dimensions,
𝜀𝑡 a vector of innovations with (𝑛 × 1) dimensions, (𝐸(𝜀𝑡 ) = 0, 𝐸(𝜀𝑡 𝜀𝑡′ ) = Ω, and 𝐸(𝜀𝑡 𝜀𝑡′ ) = 0
for all 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠).
According to (9), the variance-covariance matrix of the vector of innovations 𝜀𝑡 can contain
non-zero values outside of its diagonal. This implies that, even if the dynamic evolution of the
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variables of 𝑦𝑡 is very well estimated by the autoregressive structure of the polynomial ∅(𝐿), the
residual innovations can be correlated there between. The Structural Vector Autoregressive
Models (SVAR) were developed for resolving this problem. They transform the correlated
innovation series of the vector 𝜀𝑡 in a vector of orthogonal (independent) structural shocks that we
name 𝑒𝑡 , and, that can economically be interpreted. For understanding the logic and the notations
of SVAR (p) developed in this paper and the effect on the structure of the model after the
transformation of the 𝜀𝑡 in a vector of independent shocks named 𝑒𝑡 , it is necessary to proceed at
some developments that can be seen in Hamilton (1994) and Stier (2001). Thereby, taking into
account the above, the equation (9), by deleting the constant, can be written in VAR (p) Moving
Average:
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶(𝐿)𝜀𝑡

(10)

With 𝐶(𝐿) = 𝜙(𝐿)−1
The VAR (p) representation, by deleting the constant, of the dynamic structural model associated
at the equation (9) is:
𝐵(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡

(11)

With a variance-covariance matrix for 𝑒𝑡 and normalized at 𝐼𝑛 , that is to say 𝐸(𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑡′ ) = 𝐼𝑛 . The
VMA (p) with the structural shocks associated at the equation (11) is:
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐿)𝑒𝑡

(12)

With 𝐴(𝐿) = 𝐵(𝐿)−1 where 𝐴𝑗 is a matrix (𝑛 × 𝑛) that must be identified. The elements 𝑎𝑛𝑖
measure the effects of the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ structural shock contained in 𝑒𝑡 after j periods on the 𝑛𝑡ℎ variable.
In equalizing the equations (10) and (12), we have:
𝐴(𝐿)𝑒𝑡 = 𝐶(𝐿)𝜀𝑡

(13)

Thereby, we connect the estimated residuals and the structural shocks.
Knowing that “C” is an identity matrix, after estimating the matrix A, the structural
residuals can be deducted of those observed. The transformed model, having more parameters to
estimate than the VAR of reduced form that is estimable, we impose restrictions for identifying
the matrix A. More econometric softwares use the model named “AB” for the short term restrictions
and “C” for those of the long term. In this context, for choosing the restrictions adapted in our
model, we base on (Blanchard and Quah, 1989). They use short term restrictions for the demand
shocks and long term restrictions for the production shocks. Our model is based on the fluctuations
of the activities and the demand shocks that are short term phenomena. Thereby, we estimate them
using short term SVAR and Cholesky’s decomposition. According to Sims (1980), the Cholesky’s
decomposition is a method of identification of the response functions in a VAR model; therefore,
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this method is a SVAR. In this context, we impose exclusion restrictions on the variables that are
not significant in the matrix A for respecting the just identification.
Also, it is important to specify that we use data of conjuncture. In this context, one can pose
the question of the utilization of the VAR of raw data (non-stationary data) or those corrected of
the seasonal variations. For the correction of the seasonal variations, we added in equation (9) with
the constant, a vector of determinist variables that we name (𝐷𝑡 ), containing the constant, the
seasonal variables, a trend and others intervention variables:
𝑦𝑡 = ∅(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 + 𝜓𝐷𝑡 +𝜀𝑡
(14)
The matrix 𝜓 has the coefficients associated with constant vector, seasonal influences, determinist
trend… Because, if 𝑦𝑡 has the variables with the seasonal profiles, a part of this seasonality will
be in 𝜀𝑡 , except in the presence of seasonal cointegration between the variables of the vector 𝑦𝑡 .
However, in the literature, there are the papers that use the variables corrected of seasonality
(Pétursson and Slok, 2001) and those with the variables with seasonality (Brüggemann, 2001).
According to Maravall (1994), the series corrected of seasonality are estimated, and not the
observations. In these conditions, they depend on the value estimated by statistical technics; the
confidence interval for example. Also, it is necessary to use more assumptions like the
orthogonality of unobserved components (seasonality, trend…). That is to say that the seasonal
fluctuations are independent from all the others fluctuations affecting an economic variable, while
this is not always the case in the facts. Also, the smoothing of the auto-correlated functions of raw
data by the correction of seasonality is impacted by the method of correction of seasonality used.
Data Characteristics
We calculate the elasticities using SVAR model, under stationary condition and Wold
theorem. The macroeconomic data are expressed in the U.S. dollars and come from the World
Bank database (the web site database ("African Development indicators")) and the OECD
("StatExtracts"). The variables are in logarithm for the interpretation in terms of elasticities. ADF
and Fhillips-Perron tests are used to study the stationarity of the series for being in accordance
with the assumption of the empirical specification (stationary condition for using Wold theorem)
(See tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C.) We remove the aberrant values of the variables and we
replace them by the reasonable values using linear interpolation. In applying the models, the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is used to determine the optimal lag length. After the
estimations, the residual autocorrelation test (LM test) and collinearity test (Wald test) are
performed, and the stability of the models is also checked.
Knowing that the order of apparition of the variables in the SVAR is capital for the final
results, we base our intuition on economic theory to do this. In this context, we have the following
classification:
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑑, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑑, ℎ𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎, 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎, 𝑔𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎,
𝑌𝑡 = (
)
(15)
𝑥𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎, 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎, 𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎, 𝑖𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎
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According to (15), real GDP of Kenya is impacted by external and domestic variables. Real GDP
of China is influenced by real GDP of OECD, harmonized inflation in OECD, household
consumption and investment in China.
Results
Based on table 3, we can view the origins of the impulsions of GDP in short term in the
first period. Thereby, we represent in equations (16) and (17) above, the causes of the impulsions
of Chinese GDP and Kenyan GDP. In short term, the perturbations of gdpchina are caused by their
perturbations with an elasticity estimated at 0.017. They are also caused by gdpocde (0.071),
hcchina (0.622) and invchina (0.247) perturbations. We observe that the elasticity of domestic
variables are higher that the elasticity of dgpoecd. This situation is confirmed by the impulse
response functions (See figure 1). In fact, an increase in gdpoecd, hcchina and invchina has initially
a significant and positive effect on gdpchina respectively by 1.9%, 7.5% and 3%, and these effects
disappear after four, two and three years. Concerning gdpkenya, its impulsions are their origin by
0.02, OECD and Chinese conjuncture origins; with 0.358 and -0.064 for gdpoecd and infoecd, and
0.209 for gdpchina. They are also gkenya, xkenya, invkenye, mkenya and infkenya origins. gdpocde
and gdpchina shocks have initially a positive effect on gdpkenya by 5.03% and 3.8% and the
perturbations disappear after five and three years . The reaction to infoecd shocks is not significant
(See figure 3).
Based on table 4, we have the origins of the impulsions of GDP in the second period.
Thereby, we represent in equations (18) and (19) above, the causes of the impulsions of Chinese
GDP and Kenyan GDP. In a short term, the perturbations of gdpchina are caused by their
perturbations with an elasticity estimated at 0.019. They are also caused by gdpocde (0.091),
hcchina (0.63) and invchina (0.24). As the first period, we observe that the elasticities of domestic
variables are still higher that the elasticity of dgpoecd. This situation is still confirmed by the
impulse response functions (See figure 2). In fact, an increase in gdpoecd, hcchina and invchina
has initially a significant and positive effect on gdpchina respectively by 2.5%, 7.5% and 3%, and
these effects disappear after five, two and three years (See figure 2). Concerning gdpkenya, its
impulsions are their origin by 0.025, OECD and Chinese conjuncture origins, with 0.321 and -0.05
for gdpoecd and infoecd, and 0.237 for gdpchina. They are also gkenya, xkenya, invkenye, mkenya
and infkenya origins. Thereby, in comparison to the first period, we observe a decrease in exposure
of gdpkenya to gdpoecd and infoecd by -0.037 and -0.014, and an increase in the exposure to
gdpchina by 0.028. These results are confirmed by the impulse response functions. Now, gdpocde
and gdpchina shocks have still initially a positive effect on gdpkenya, but by 5% and 3.9%, and
the perturbations disappear after three and five years (See figure 4). Thereby, the duration of the
reaction regresses of two years in the first case and progresses of two years in the second case.
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Table 3
Results with end duration study in 2006 (* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%)
1
−2∗∗∗
0.55∗∗∗
0
−0.071∗∗∗
−1.029∗∗∗
−0.453∗∗∗
0.731∗∗
0.499∗∗∗
0
0
[−0.358∗∗∗
=
0.045∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
[ 0

0
1
0.158∗∗∗
0
0
0
−0.196∗∗∗
−0.259∗∗∗
−0.205∗∗∗
0
1.995∗∗∗
0.064∗∗∗
0
0.169∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
−0.673∗∗∗
−0.622∗∗∗
1.531∗∗∗
0
0
1.292∗∗∗
0
1.068∗∗∗
0

0
0
0.086∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
1
−0.247∗∗∗
0.63∗∗∗
0
0
0.368∗∗∗
0
1.205∗∗∗
0

0
0
0
0.1∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0.017∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
−2.748∗∗∗
0
0
−1.564∗∗∗
0
−1.288∗∗∗
−0.209∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0.091∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
1
−0.266∗∗∗
−0.931∗∗∗
−0.351∗∗∗
0
1.958∗∗∗
−0.4∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.079∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0.567∗∗∗
0
0
−0.122∗∗∗

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.103∗∗∗
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
−0.135∗∗
0
−1.47∗∗∗
−0.059∗∗

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.055∗∗∗
0
0
0

𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡 = 0.017 𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡 + 0.071 𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑡 + 0.622 𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡 + 0.247 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
(9.38)
(3.17)
(17.78)
(9.44)

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
−0.114∗∗∗

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.024∗∗∗
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
−1.669∗∗∗
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.473∗∗∗
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.003∗∗∗

𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑡
0
𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑡
0
𝑒ℎ𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒𝑔𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒𝑥𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
0.02∗∗∗ ] [𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 ]

(16)

𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 = 0.02 𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 + 0.358 𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑡 − 0.064𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑡 + 0.209 𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡 +
(9.38)
(3)
(3.14)
(3.14)
0.4 𝜀𝑔𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 + 0.122 𝜀𝑥𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 + 0.059𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 + 0.114 𝜀𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 − 0.003 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
(17)
(5.44)
(2.99)
(2.98)
(−3.07)
(2)
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0 𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑡
0 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑡
0 𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑔𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑥𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
1] [𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 ]

Table 4
Results with end duration study in 2012 (* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%)
1
−2.066∗∗∗
0.636∗∗∗
0
−0.091∗∗∗
−1.193∗∗∗
−0.319∗∗∗
0.801∗∗∗
0.553∗∗∗
−0.038∗∗
0
[−0.321∗∗∗
0.047∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
[ 0

0
1
−0.109∗∗∗
0
0
0
−0.137∗∗∗
0
−0.081∗∗∗
0.005∗∗
0
0.05∗∗∗

0
0.296∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
−0.666∗∗∗
−0.63∗∗∗
1.077∗∗∗
0
1.039∗∗
0.886∗∗∗
0
1.664∗∗∗
0

0
0
0.086∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
1
−0.24∗∗∗
0.399∗∗
0
0
0.206∗∗
0
1.205∗∗∗
0

0
0
0
0.104∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0.019∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
−1.966∗∗∗
0
0
−1.028∗∗∗
0
−1.958∗∗∗
−0.237∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0.101∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
1
−0.251∗∗∗
−0.778∗∗∗
−0.311∗∗∗
0
1.917∗∗∗
−0.509∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.076∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
−0.602∗∗∗
0
0
−0.1∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.109∗∗∗
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
−0.214∗∗∗
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.059∗∗∗
0
0
0

𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡 =0.019𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡 + 0.091 𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑡 + 0.63 𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡 + 0.24 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
(10)
(3.46)
(17.86)
(9.93)

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
−0.102∗∗

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.05∗∗∗
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.791∗∗∗
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

0 𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑑𝑡
0 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑑𝑡
0 𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑔𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
=
0 𝜀𝑥𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
𝜀
0 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
1] [𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 ]

𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑑𝑡
0
𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑑𝑡
0
𝑒ℎ𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒𝑔𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒𝑥𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
0
0.025∗∗∗ ] [𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 ]

(18)

𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 =0.025𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 + 0.321 𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑡 − 0.05 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑡 + 0.237 𝜀𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡
(2.96)
(2.84)
(10)
(−3.12)
𝜀
𝜀
𝜀
0.1
0.102
0.509
+
𝑔𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 +
𝑥𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡 +
𝑚𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑦𝑎𝑡
(19)
(2.98)
(2)
(8.2)
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Conclusion and Political Economic Implications
The development of a non-exposed sector to international shocks in African countries leads
their economies to resist to external shocks (Assoumou Ella and Bastidon Gilles, 2015; Assoumou
Ella, 2014). In this paper, we investigate the role of the partners’ diversification in developing a
model with three countries. Since several years, the developed countries were the buyers of the
raw materials exported by the African countries (Madeley, 2003). Thereby, they are exposed to
shocks in developed countries (Berman and Martin, 2012). However, in the recent years, the
diversifications of the trade and financial partners in Africa, with the increase of the exchanges
with China essentially are observed (Hugon, 2012). Also, the economic conjunctures of the
developed countries and Asian emerging countries tend to be decoupled, because Asian growth is
essentially determined by the domestic household consumption, investment and the regional
integration (Dées and Vansteenkiste, 2007; Lambert and Chavy-Martin, 2008). However, there is
no consensus in the literature concerning this assumption. In these conditions, we develop a
theoretical model of the exposure of a developing country's income with the characteristics of the
African economies to shocks of a developed country, according to two cases: coupling and
decoupling economic conjunctures of developed and emerging countries. The results suggest that
the partners’ diversification permits the developing country to resist to shocks of developed
country if the economic conjunctures of the developed and emerging countries are decoupled. We
empirically verify this model in Kenyan country using a correlation matrix of cycles and a SVAR
model. The results confirm that Chinese conjuncture tends to be less exposed to OECD countries'
income and inflation shocks. Also, income in this country more depends on domestic investment
and household consumption, in comparison to the dependence on OECD country shocks. Also, the
exposure of Kenya income regresses and the dependence on Chinese conjuncture progresses,
confirming theoretical results.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Impulse response functions; end 2006

Figure A1: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (gdpocde) response variable (gdpchina)

Figure A2: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (hcchina) response variable (gdpchina)

Figure A3: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (invchina) response variable (gdpchina)
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Figure A4: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (gdpocde) response variable (gdpkenya)

Figure A5: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (infocde) response variable (gdpkenya)

Figure A6: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (gdpchina) response variable (gdpkenya)
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Appendix B: Impulse response functions; end 2012

Figure B1: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (gdpocde) response variable (gdpchina)

Figure B2: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (hcchina) response variable (gdpchina)

Figure B3: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (invchina) response variable (gdpchina)
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Figure B4: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (gdpocde) response variable (gdpkenya)

Figure B5: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (infocde) response variable (gdpkenya)

Figure B6: Graph by irfname: impulse variable (gdpchina) response variable (gdpkenya)
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Appendix C: Unit Root Tests
Table C1
Unit Root Tests; end 2006
Variable

ADF
Level

PP
First Differences Level

First
Differences

log_gdpoecd

-2.353

-3.425**

-1.819

-3.396**

log_infoecd

-1.444

-6.078***

-1.554

-6.074***

log_hcchina

0.966

-6.985***

1.183

-6.89***

log_invchina

0.607

-6.52***

0.675

-7.35***

log_gdpchina 2.093

-5.979***

2.116

-6.021***

log_gkenya

-1.53

-4.984***

-1.445

-4.999***

log_xkenya

-0.741

-6.261***

-0.753

-6.293***

log_invkenya -0.997

-6.972***

-0.973

-7.002***

log_mkenya

-0.457

-6.147***

-0.457

-6.128***

log_imkenya

-4.053***

-

-2.7**

-

infkenya

-3.03**

-

-2.988**

-

log_gdpkeny

-0.902

-4.88***

-0.891

-4.886***

a
Note: ADF and PP denotes Augmented Dickey- Fuller and Phillips- Perron unit root tests
respectively. (***), (**) and (*) denote significant at1%, 5%, and 10% critical values respectively.
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Table C2
Unit Root Tests; end 2012
Variable

ADF
Level

PP
First Differences Level

First
Differences

log_gdpoecd

-3.036**

-3.807***

-2.418

-3.753***

log_infoecd

-2.095

-8.945***

-1.924

-9.196***

log_hcchina

2.254

-6.747***

3.23

-6.768***

log_invchina

1.305

-6.856***

1.232

-7.543***

log_gdpchina

3.238

-5.902***

3.23

-5.896***

log_gkenya

-1.246

-5.386***

-1.189

-5.39***

log_xkenya

-0.305

-6.941***

-0.34

-6.968***

log_invkenya

-0.657

-7.366***

-0.623

-7.393***

log_mkenya

0.049

-6.596***

0.034

-6.583***

log_imkenya

-1.861

-5.52***

-1.371

-5.924***

infkenya

-3.626***

-

-3.577***

-

log_gdpkenya

-0.495

-5.172***

-0.542

-5.167***

Note: ADF and PP denotes Augmented Dickey- Fuller and Phillips- Perron unit root tests
respectively. (***), (**) and (*) denote significant at1%, 5%, and 10% critical values respectively.
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A Brief Note from the IJAD Editorial Management Team
International Journal of African Development is an open access interdisciplinary journal on
issues related to sustainable development in Africa that was begun 2013. The first issues feature
selected papers from previous international conferences on African development. We are soliciting
manuscripts for future issues throughout the year. Contributing authors are advised to prepare their
manuscripts using APA format to be considered for review and before they can be accepted.
Please submit your contributions online at http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/

